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The Moral Judgement

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Morality and Identification
The Moral Judgement

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Abstract

Risk and probability connections - forms of experience - create types of knowledge relations mediating social interaction. They are based on types of social identification. On these processes are created dominating social dimensions at building knowledge meaning.

Present is not certain; experience is mediated by social processes, it is not immediate. Experience processes – probability building, constituting on knowledge, information security and morality development – are contingent social on foundation of risk and probability relationships. Certain at social action is relative certain, mediated form of knowledge. Knowledge is conceptual relationship into reality. Truth is not relative but knowledge. Knowledge is probable.

Social is developed in processes for conceptual relationships into reality. Social consciousness is based on risk. Humans are concepts-making animals. Risks at conceptual knowledge are managed in continuity of social interaction by probabilities.

Relative certainty varies according to knowledge relations constitution; so does social action based on it. Probabilities, continuity build relations where knowledge has meaning and social action happens - social relations.

There are three different objects for probable knowledge

• Contingent objects whose probability is determined at risk level 0 < probability < 1,
• Non-contingent objects in frame of contingent social where is possible to create knowledge. Its probability at action is subjectively approaching to certainty and as social processes approaching to infinity,
• Non-contingent objects without relation to contingent social reality and not defined processes for knowledge creation and development, also no probability building processes but non-knowledge and non-social.

Development of knowledge objects and probable knowledge is development of global social dimension. It is conceptually contingent but may be assumed non-contingent at relative certainty.

Purposive action and its probable social courses - social relations - constitute on unlimited but finite number of social acts with arbitrary probabilities. Every act is singular and based on conceptual relationship into reality, also presupposes social processes, mediation, which creates relative certainties. By distribution of probabilities is created courses of social action. Distributions constitute different types of global-history connections. By forms of relative certainties is created forms of social formations on identification of social objects.

Means-ends relations follow knowledge probability building processes. Whether unlimited or finite - risk or probability - is dominating, building processes and means-ends relationships are different. At empirical knowledge processes is defined unique probability match of means and ends and instrumental rationality. At probability building processes dominated by global dimensions is created probable means for ends and manifest probability match of means and ends.
Probability building processes create properties for social action, rationality and social totalities. They are conceptual representations, mediated in action, of type of knowledge universality in specific worlds. They are grounded on knowledge, social identification, responsibility and morality.

Morality and responsibility are social properties of action, knowledge relations. The 'natural' state of human in society is that of a moral being. Object of moral judgment is non-contingent at contingent social. By non-contingent objects without contingent social reality is created non-social and non-morality, Evil.

Social exist because Good is more probable than Evil. The question of universal humanity is: Why and at which conditions? – This may be formulated also: How is social development constituted when it creates Good more probable than Evil? Morality is the identification factor of humankind and humanity.

Identification is based on bare, mere and pure subjective, individual action without interests or structural obligations. This builds on development of global dimensions of social and their constitution at individual connections of global and history. On them is also dependent probability of Good over Evil. At its foundation is neither authority, interest nor obligation; it is based on meaningful knowledge mediated at probable social relations.

Global knowledge relations are based on probable connections of global and history. They are determined at objects as probable knowledge relations. The social change at information society is a change of knowledge relation instead of technological change. In Globalnet, with integrity created by information security, there exists no centre or authority that may justify any social doctrine or regulations determining moral judgements.

If people should act according to principles that may be a general law - also is supposed a categorical imperative – these principles are 'reasonable' on the ground that they are probable guarantees for continuity of social relationships. Nothing else is needed as long as social structures continue, society or community are defined, 'general laws' are defined, and concept 'all in society’ has a meaning.

In general case there is no immediate social processes to conclude what is totality where general laws should exist - 'Others' according to whom we should orientate. The ‘Others’ must be identified and experienced in processes which social itself determines and which are different depending on the probability building processes where knowledge is created. 'Others’ presuppose processes for knowledge, information security and morality building; they are made by people; the form where this is done creates identification of social.

Social development is based neither on divine moral, law nor divine economy, but on human dignity.
The Moral Judgement

"...meaning is situated in the ethical, presupposed by all culture and all meaning. Morality does not belong to culture: it enables one to judge it" (Levinas, 1972/1987b, 100, Meaning and Sense)

1. Knowledge Relations

Global Relations

Social dimensions – Global and History - are determined by relationships of risk and probability – on conditions for Global at risk equal to 1 and History at risk equal to 0 (Mäkinen, 2012/9, 2012/10, 2012/11, 2012/16). These build global-history continuum where probable social relations are created. When their relationship is constant in community or society type of integrity social objects - humans, action and knowledge - are identified social by relative certainty at this totality. It consists of social processes which constitute a unique experience world. This world constitutes however on risk and probability relationships and social interaction is based on mediation of knowledge on conditions of contingent knowledge relations. Identification, although experienced ‘absolute’, is mediated and has contingent content.

In Global relations – as in global network – are no constant global-history relations. Identification of objects is grounded on specific social processes constituting knowledge development and information security which determine identification’s contingent content. On these conditions existence of knowledge is not evident ‘when human experiences and knows’ but it has specific conditions of existence. On the other hand this makes possible to understand the properties of knowledge in a different way than is possible in other types of social relations and integrity. Those properties should not be derived from global network – or other contents of knowledge from some other types of social relations – but there they are apparent as results of historically global building processes of knowledge. Everything in knowledge and social is grounded on properties of interaction; all totalities – which may seem to influence on them – are developed approximations of interaction, limiting values.

On contingent knowledge and information security development processes should at global relations be defined also network dimension where existence of knowledge is based on processes for identification of social objects and on it based information security. Data may exist in global network without knowledge qualities and builds knowledge only by probability. Then it may also build non-knowledge which is socially determined but has no properties constituting social relations. Actually same situation is in all other social relations.

Social interaction is constituted on foundation of probable knowledge. This property of knowledge consists continuing social relations. Continuity cannot also be evaluated in relation to existing social totality – functionally in sociological meaning

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1 Documents in Knowledge of Society White Papers series are referenced by year and number in series and documents in Knowledge of Society Training Papers Series by year and number with prefix 'Tr' (yhteiskunnantieto.fi). The updated versions of documents keep their original number.
– but probable knowledge builds social interaction. Its active forms at relative certainty constitute moral judgements on which are built social relations. Contingent properties – unlimited but finite knowledge on foundation of risk and probability relation – constitute the specific properties of social, purposive action, morality, rationality and integrity; they have no other foundation. On contingent existence of non-knowledge is based on the other hand non-moral judgements or Evil.

Morality is wanted, Evil is not; Morality is property of contingent social, Evil is not. Morality is based on knowledge, Evil on non-knowledge, on conditions where knowledge cannot be created or probability building processes constituted. These may presuppose generalizations for unique probability match on conditions where it cannot be made. The content of purposive action, wanting is constituted when for action is possible to determine social probability, grounded on identification, on which contingent social constitutes continuity. ‘Purposive’, ‘morality’ and ‘wanting’ are social properties based on contingent, unlimited but finite determination of global-history relationships; any other property they do not have. The meaning of these concepts is social probability of action constituting social relationships (Weber, 1921/1976, 13). But these properties are contingent and action which is not on their conditions is always possible, action which is not based on knowledge and does not build ‘wanting’ – although may be definitely ‘wanted’ on conditions of social formations build on relative certainty of a contingent type.

In global relations networks are constituted on foundation of probable identification of social objects. Knowledge existence depends directly on information security. On these conditions also non-knowledge and non-social are actual, everyday.

Knowledge

The forms of risk and probability connections, risk management processes or forms of experience, create types of knowledge relations mediating social interaction, based on types of social identification. On these processes are created dominating social dimensions in building knowledge probability. Processes may be conceptualized by dimensions: historical, structural-empirical and global probability building process (Mäkinen, 2012/9, Mäkinen, 2011/Tr3). These processes are determined in unlimited and finite world build on existence of risks and probability creating continuity of this world. They are corresponded with historical processes where relative certainty, managed risk, already exist.

Present is not certain, although ‘reality exists in a present’ (Mead, 1932/1980, 1). Experience is mediated by social processes, not immediate. These processes building experience – in general probability building, constituting on knowledge, information security and morality development – are contingent social on foundation of risk and probability relationships. Probability of experience builds probable knowledge. Certain at social action is relative certain, mediated form of knowledge. Knowledge is conceptual relationship into reality.

The creation of meaningful knowledge in global-history continuum means probability creation, also a creation of concept for relatively certain present. This is based on contingent knowledge building. By meaningful knowledge is possible to specify social interaction and the social itself without supposition of infinite processes for knowledge creation.

At the historical probability creation ‘history’ is the relevant social dimension and determines continuity. Structural form of probability building is determined by
empirical active knowledge. This presupposes determined connections of social dimensions. In global probability creation such a connection exists but it is created in processes for knowledge development and information security. Risk and probability connections at global knowledge relations may be several.

Probability building processes correspond to widening processes of social interaction. The knowledge creation, also risk management, presupposes social sets of incidents. These ‘large sets of incidents’ may be build on foundation of history, empirical relation into reality or in genuine global sets of incidents where relevant knowledge creation is not possible to determine on foundation of empirical experience in action. Widening processes do not presuppose geographical widening; in global network geographic distance rather looses its meaning.

Widening processes however do not explain knowledge creation types; they are based on contingent knowledge, knowledge properties and on them founded meaningful social interaction.

Knowledge is based on experience, created by probability building processes. There is no limitation for conceptual knowledge building. The way conceptual knowledge is created is not limited by experience or knowledge continuity; any a priori suppositions or ‘laws of thought’ do not limit it. Concerning ‘matters of fact’ it is always possible to suppose a contrary fact (Hume, 1748/1964, 22 -23). Knowledge transferability instead presupposes transferability or continuity, which are based on probability, on continuous interaction between humans. By this interaction, determined by communication, is created social (Mead, 1934/1972, Habermas, 1981).

The practice for knowledge relation is determined in communicating knowledge with other people, ‘consociates’ (Schutz, 1962, 15 – 17). Their identification requires social processes which change at development of knowledge probability building (Makinen, 2012/16, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5). On probability building processes are created different forms of social identification and social relations. Neither knowledge building nor identification is determined at absolute framework.

Communicating knowledge presupposes knowledge presentation in a conceptual, transferable form. It may consist of gestures, language, but also presented in documents, files, databases, network information. These forms are based on risk which depends on the form of social identification. In relations which are not determined at unique relative certainty it does not presuppose physical interaction of humans in the physical space-time but specific social processes for interaction.

Social relations are built on identified ‘totalities’ on foundation of knowledge mediation. There is created contingent social worlds which are unlimited and finite grounded on knowledge properties. Social structures or other totalities, where infinite generalizations are possible, are created only on limited dimensions conditions, also at specific knowledge relations.

Interaction has special forms according to forms of conceptual knowledge. It changes radically in global communications network. ICT-technologies do change the form of social interaction by presentation form of transferable knowledge. Computers made possible knowledge development and processing independently of special activities and representation frameworks. There were developed databases and the activities of knowledge developing social units – as organizations – were possible to determine by knowledge. Network information is based on data
transmission in global communications network. It does build knowledge only on special social conditions that are independent of fixed relations in social space-time.

The information society change is the change of knowledge. On it is based change of morality.

**Knowledge, Unlimited and Finite**

Knowledge is created by risk building knowledge relation by probability at social interaction. Knowledge is unlimited transferable – not being away where it is transferred from. This property creates conceptual knowledge including risk and global dimensions. Knowledge meaning is constituted by probability building continuity and history dimensions. Connections between conceptual and active (tacit) knowledge (Nonaka – Takeuchi, 1995, Takeuchi – Nonaka, 2004) are created in social processes for global-history connections. In global relations explicit determination of knowledge presupposes network dimensions and information security (Mäkinen, 2012/9, Mäkinen, 2012/16).

Knowledge contingency, its unlimited and finite qualities, are determined by knowledge creation, development and information security processes. This corresponds to probability as a property of knowledge and social action; they are not possible to present as dimensions whose activity in creation of knowledge should be immediate. If such immediate processes exist, they constitute a special knowledge relation based on relative certainty, also empirical knowledge building at constant global-history connections.

Knowledge exists always in specific ‘worlds’ constituting on its unlimited and finite qualities. Universality in this world may have forms depending on probability building processes. At current social change is important the difference between generalization and transferability (Mäkinen, 2012/16).

Knowledge empirical probability building processes create generalized knowledge at structural knowledge relations – also knowledge by properties limited but infinite, or at least applicable on high probability at unique probability match. Global knowledge creation processes build transferability of knowledge – also unlimited but finite properties where contingency of risk is managed by probable application of knowledge. Generalization is type of transferability at social structure where is possible to determine unique probability match of incidents and social properties.

Transferability and generality are properties of contingent knowledge creation processes. These create knowledge and social. Knowledge types do differ on foundation of differences in contingent processes. On mediation of knowledge are based different types of social forms, rationality, integrity and morality.

Social is developed in interaction of conceptual and active, on action related knowledge. Actually only active knowledge is ‘real’, applied in action. But when action is determined – as probability distributions of relative certain acts - applied is conceptual knowledge by historical, generalized or transferable qualities. On these knowledge forms is created different types of social. Knowledge forms make

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2 Risk and manifold, pluralistic reality are parallel phenomena. They are also foundation of theory and belief creation: "... existence is pluralist. Here the plural is not a multiplicity of existence; it appears in existing itself ... we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery" (Levinas, 1987a, 75). – If creation of knowledge is unique, also risk does not exist, knowledge has no role in building of social – and neither morality.
possible the totality for social interaction – transferability – and action in frames of that interaction – continuity. In global form these presuppose determination of network and information security dimensions.

Social consciousness is based on risk. “Man is a tool-making animal” (Benjamin Franklin, 1706 – 1790) should preferably be heard: “Humans are concepts-making animals” (Mäkinen, 2009/14). Conceptual knowledge means that interaction is possible to relate into matters that are not immediately experienced but however identified knowledge and social. This risk is managed in continuity of social interaction by a certain probability. Society is always risk society (Beck, 1986) - other kinds of societies exist not - but the form where risk is managed varies.

Limiting values of social dimensions – Global by risk probability equal to 1 and History by risk probability equal to 0 - are not reached, but knowledge relation determines a specific relationship between them, where experience is determined and action goes on at foundation of relative certainty. This is created in probability building processes – is also relative - which create conceptual relationships into reality and determine knowledge objects. Knowledge in action or active knowledge - relative certainty of knowledge - creates purposive action, decisions of means and ends in social action and moral judgements. Relative certainty forms change when knowledge is developed on foundation of unlimited and finite properties.

**Probable Knowledge and Non-Knowledge**

Knowledge relation concerns probable knowledge, knowledge by certain conditions where it and social objects are identified. There is no necessity for knowledge creation – for example ‘when human experiences or human thinks’ – but it is contingent property determined by unlimited and finite qualities and presupposes existence of social context in sense of identification, may it be identification of humans or any other social objects.

This means that there may exist also non-knowledge. It is also determined in relation to social, but not in contingent social context. Properties of non-knowledge are determined by risk and also transferability but it does not constitute probability which may build knowledge meaning, continuity. By transferability qualities of knowledge it may have social approximations of action which constitute social formations - or quasi-relations. Knowledge on these cannot be build, unlimited and finite properties are not defined and probability exits not but action according to formations is possible – not in sense of continuing social relations but on duration which may be relevant at arbitrary relative certainty. Especially in global network may be transferred data which has no social context where it is identified. It is defined knowledge, has a meaning when the probability for data, experienced or theoretical, is determined. Same applies into all the other forms of knowledge transferability, although not evidently, because knowledge relation may exist in defined relationship of global and history where knowledge existence, identification may appear ‘given’.

Probable knowledge concept differs from probability of knowledge – knowledge being true by some probability. This is a relation created especially at generalizations, also social structures where is possible to determine unique probability match. In transferability connection probability match is not necessarily unique; objects may have some social qualities by probability. Probability of knowledge is a social process of risk management of conceptual knowledge. If risk is determined in unique probability connection is determined constant global-history connection, if not several global-history connections exist. When knowledge is
determined in social dimensions of global and history, it is always probable knowledge and may contain some absolute properties only as limiting values by relative certainty.

Probable knowledge is conceptual relation into reality, not an empirical property. Also probability of knowledge is possible to determine through knowledge relation by a set of incidents spatially or in time. ‘All’ and ‘always’ do not mean anything unless there is defined the knowledge relation where they are valid. Probability of a proposition being knowledge is not dependent about amount of observations or incidents, but the form social global-history connections defined as conceptual relations into reality.

When knowledge seems to be knowledge as such, it is created at some determined, identified, developed relationship of global and history. It may be based on moral judgement in value or instrumental rationality or scientific relationship of theoretical and empirical components of knowledge. This is dependent on the probable results of active risk management of conceptual knowledge. There exists no a priori ‘right’ relationship of conceptual and active components of knowledge.

2. Social Interaction and Knowledge

Relative Certainty

Social is communication at human interaction by contingent properties of knowledge. At interaction exists the only certainty knowledge has; “...reality exists in a present” (Mead, 1932/1980, 1). It consists of a continuum of present place and time, ‘here and now’. But it is based on probability building processes and constitutes conceptual relationships into reality. Probability of knowledge at interaction creates continuous social forms. Certainty at interaction is relative. Communicated knowledge is trusted (Giddens, 1990) but it is not based on necessity and trust must not be absolute or presuppose that knowledge is true by some criteria.

Probability of social action - based on probable knowledge mediation - creates relative certainty. It is based on interaction of identified consociates (Schutz) and constitutes proximity at social relations (Levinas, 1982/1987a, 104 – 105, 1954/1987b, 31, /1987b, 109 – 126, Bauman, 1989/1991, 184 - 188). It has different forms according to building processes of social probability where relative certainty is based on. In social interaction is no other conception for proximity and extension than probability and risk relationships by identification of interaction participants.

Morality is based on responsibility mediating interaction of identified social objects. Responsibility is probable and continuing social relations of socially identified objects. It is also based on relative certainty and at it created probability of social relations. It has no other social qualities than identification of contingent objects at interaction and continuity based on this. But when relative certainty and probability based on it change, changes also responsibility and morality.

3 In global networks is no difference of interaction on any extensions; identification at 5 meters and 5000 kilometres are equal.

4 “I understand responsibility as responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as face” (Levinas, 1982/1985, 95). - In concept ‘face’ identification at social relation is constituted without any social structure, influence or interest, as for example power relation or utility (Bauman, 1989/1991, 182 – 183, 214). On it is based moral
Relative certainties are created at probability building processes. These constitute conceptual relations into reality which create specific objects for knowledge. Knowledge types depend on these objects. They, also conceptual relationships into reality determine the development processes of knowledge and constitute the contingent properties of knowledge creation processes which make it knowledge.

Truth is not relative but knowledge. - Whether knowledge is true may be interpreted on foundation does it correspond to the experienced facts. This relationship however is not a priori determined; it is mediated by knowledge relation that consists about sets of knowledge conceptualizations and experienced incidents. Truth presupposes also specification of knowledge transferability that makes possible its transmission in social interaction – a kind of objectivity of knowledge. On the other hand it presupposes continuity, where knowledge meaning is based on. In every case truth presupposes knowledge working in action and vice versa. Probability of knowledge, the variation of its truth value, may be specified by differences in its active use – and verification of knowledge – but its differences as moral judgements or factual statements cannot. The last ones may be interpreted as different types of probable knowledge, in different types of knowledge relation and their objects.

Knowledge creation by risk and social relations, its contingent properties, mean knowledge mediation which is constituted on identified relations in manifold reality. Probability there created is the mediation factor in knowledge. If risk exist not knowledge is created in immediate processes without contingent qualities. Then uncertainty of knowledge depends only on its concrete building processes. Social on that foundation should be based only on infinite generalizations – or ‘natural’ properties which may be identified social only in infinite generalizations.

Action presupposes trust on knowledge; action’s actual course must be predictable in a ‘reasonable’ way; also by a probability that is trusted or has a relative certainty. Then however action is supposed to exist as given and probability at knowledge is functional in relation to it. Then also action’s moral qualities are given. But action is created by knowledge contingency and on it should exist also its moral qualities; they are not created by some external properties of social relations. Action has always same functional forms attached to the forms of knowledge – trust on validity of knowledge and its reliability in human action. And also in same way as knowledge, these validation forms presuppose each others.

Social Relations and Knowledge

The actual problem is why and how experience constitutes knowledge and why and how incidents constitute social. What knowledge or social are is more or less coincidental, historical facts based on concrete creation and development processes. Their existence, also creation of world where these properties come out, is dependent on contingent, unlimited but finite, conditions which make possible active knowledge and interaction concerning knowledge and social. Knowledge is not immediate but requires specific processes to come on.

The only form where knowledge exist is active knowledge, and the only form where social exists is social interaction; they build the material for these phenomena.

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5 Morality also has no societal but social origin (Bauman, 1989/1991, 179 – 183)
(Touraine, 2000, 149 – 153, Touraine, 1988). Mediation of conceptual knowledge, in any of its forms, as generality and transferability, happens only on foundation for its building processes. These processes are however constituted by contingent properties of knowledge and social. On them are presented forms of morality, rationality and integrity.

Creation processes of knowledge constitute on existence of risk – especially on ‘disappearance’ of risk, which means that knowledge is always grounded on mediating processes. On these conditions constitutes knowledge relation by transferability and continuity of risk management, transferability interaction and risk management probability and continuing action. Continuity is certain only when present which is constituted as conceptual relationship into reality. Certainty on present means different things according to the constitution of knowledge relations.

Social relations are built on probabilities of courses of social action (Weber, 1921/1976, 13). These are based on relative certainties, created at action. Probability builds social proximity which is principally independent of any form of social relations although exist only on them; it is probability of social relations on contingent knowledge and social. These build morality and moral judgements at purposive action.

Knowledge relations where knowledge is evaluated according to its truth value or meaning in action – as for example moral judgements – do differ according to their objects. This determines differences as social relations by social constitution process of knowledge. Contingent objects are finite and ‘facts’ are evaluated facts. It is based on risk, in that sense global dimension, and may be evaluated by objectivity of transferability. Historical object, determined by probability at relative certainty, constitutes moral one. These types of objects correspond to the types of knowledge creation processes and social interaction, as for example scientific discourse and common social interaction.

Change of knowledge and social relations considers all forms of knowledge; they are based on probability building processes and there created conceptual relations into reality. The idea of knowledge development by increasing correspondence with truth is valid in empirical knowledge relation but does not even there mean that knowledge development should make all other knowledge forms unnecessary.

In change of empirical-structural knowledge building into global knowledge transferability form of generality (Mäkinen, 2012/16) is changing into genuine transferability. Generality applies in conditions where social relations are as such continuing and general properties define probable courses of social action. The properties of social interaction are determined in structures and profiles specifying them should have relatively high probability match.

Transferability determines a ‘world’ by conceptual knowledge properties where social action components can function at social interaction on active knowledge foundations, also probable courses of global specifications. Specifications may function together by common interfaces applied individually in action. Probability match is based on application building continuity for global components.

Although knowledge is unique in the sense that it is build on social probability building processes it may be considered as factual knowledge and moral judgement. This difference considers global and historical dimensions of social, risk and probability and by them determined relationships into reality. Social action and knowledge include always both factual and moral judgements. Regarding
dimensions of social these knowledge forms are created if a determined relation of
global and history exists.

Properties of social relations are exclusively based on action. But singular acts or
even 'large sets' of acts do not as such create them. These properties are based on
conceptual knowledge and its risk management processes, also conceptual relation
into reality, a form of experience. This is based on contingent properties of social.
There also exists no 'reason' or 'cause' for existence of social properties, they are
contingent and are always based on probability\(^6\).

It is not possible to derive existence of social relations from 'natural communities'
of human beings or moral judgements about historical properties of social action.
These historical forms do not include the basic relation of social formation: man as
a concepts making animal. Social relations and morality are not possible to define
by historical conditions or any other singular incidents. They are based on
knowledge relations that are determined by social dimensions - and on 'large' and
'long lasting’ sets of social incidents only in relation to knowledge development in
risk management process.

Morality and responsibility are properties of social.

3. **Probable Knowledge**

Contingent worlds where knowledge is created constitute on identification of
knowledge and social objects by contingent conditions; other properties knowledge
has not. Existence of knowledge is probable in human action, it is continuous
relation in world which includes risks, not in any world based on relative certainty;
there is also possibility for non-knowledge and non-action which may build relative
certainty. Knowledge presupposes determination of social dimensions Global and
History as relationships of risk and probability. Knowledge types developing in
social processes are defined by these relations and with them social changes.
Contingent properties of knowledge are conceptualized in social processes at
knowledge development and information security.

**Concept Social Reality**

Incidents observation and situation in social global and history, identification of
incidents and social interaction, is the content for experience as a presupposition of
knowledge. Identification means at social relations specification of risk and
probability of incidents and objects; identity is a conditional fact (Mäkinen,
2012/16, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5).

Concepts for spatiotemporal dimensions are not possible to explain by empirical
generalization or abstraction – not generally or socially. If knowledge is interpreted
consisting about ‘matter of facts’ and ‘laws of thought’, it should be considered that
"the idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling”
(Hume, 1748/1964, 4, 126) or we have “zwei reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung,
as Prinzipien der Erkenntnis a priori, nämlich, Raum und Zeit” (Kant, 1781/1971,
94).

\[^6\] This seems to contradict the principle"... whatever begins to exist must have a cause of
existence" (Hume, 1739-1740/1969, 126). This difference however does not consider the
concept of 'reality' but the concept of 'knowledge'.
When knowledge is interpreted as knowledge relation mediating social interaction, Global is specified as conceptual, transferable knowledge, mediating interaction and History as knowledge continuity. Then we should not suppose any 'laws of thought' or 'reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung'. The context for knowledge is created by probable management of risks included in transferable and continuing knowledge. This builds contingent processes for knowledge creation, development and information security.

Social spatiotemporal dimensions are based on knowledge properties, conceptual and active knowledge. Knowledge observed ‘here and now’ is also knowledge by a probability defined by social knowledge relations created in development process of conceptual and active knowledge relationships.

Truth is determined in the connection of social dimensions. But these dimensions do mean probable knowledge regarding different social relations. It is reasonable to say that truth is determined in special worlds specified by social relations. Relative is this world, it is conceptual relation into reality created by probability building processes, forms of experience. Experience is the only source of knowledge, but does not create knowledge immediately. It exists in contingent world by specific properties of unlimited and finite knowledge creation.

Management of risks included in conceptual knowledge should be considered as necessary conditions of social. The way management is realized is not; on the contrary: it is conditional. ‘Reality’ - in social world ‘historical’ - is coincidental and governed by causality. But this does not mean that necessity should be limited only on logical or ‘analytical’ (Hume, Kant) sciences. Conceptual probable knowledge is constituted in consciousness as necessity identification that is attached for example to tradition, social structures or moral judgements. Then necessity is also historical by risk management process.

There seems to be no reason why any form of knowledge - as mathematics and logics - should be outside the experimental and historical building of knowledge. When empiricism cannot explain it, there may be some other foundations - that are not connected to ‘analytical sentences’, ‘something existing in mind’ - for knowledge building and development. All forms of knowledge should be explained by social processes; they are human interaction. Knowledge as such is transferability and meaning or continuity in social relations. It is not based on truth. The latter one is empirical and historical in the contexts of knowledge.

Knowledge exists by conditions of transferability and continuing working in action. Knowledge relations – conditions and processes for knowledge existence – are independent of singular human experience and action but realized only at their development. Knowledge never disappears. It is related to human action everywhere and always. Everything a human has thought and expressed is worthwhile. But ‘everywhere’ and ‘always’ exist only in relation to social relations where knowledge is created and developed.

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7 "... necessity is something that exist in the mind, not in the objects” (Hume, 1739-1740/1969, 216). This 'in the mind' can be interpreted so that necessity is a managed social certainty, result of management of conceptual risk. It is then also historical, a sort of ‘information security’.

8 Hume asserts that ‘... the capacity of the mind is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity” (Hume, 1739-1740/1969, 75). - When knowledge is interpreted as knowledge relation, there is no reason to assert anything about infinity. - "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity" (William of Ockham).
Knowledge Object

It is possible to define three different objects of probable knowledge and social interaction processes that create and evaluate forms of knowledge

- Contingent objects whose probability is determined at risk level $0 < \text{probability} < 1$,
- Non-contingent objects in frame of contingent social reality where is possible to create continuing knowledge. Its probability at action is subjectively approaching to certainty and as a social process approaching to infinity,
- Non-contingent objects without contingent social reality and not defined processes for knowledge creation and development, also no probability building processes. If objects are defined in relation to social processes, is created non-knowledge and non-social.

The first two ‘worlds’ are defined by social dimensions Global with risk probability equal $= 1$ and History with risk probability equal $= 0$. Neither limit is reached at continuing social relations but subjective social action, action according to an end, may be based on both. Purposive action is thus determined by relative certainty on non-contingent object. There social relations may be presumed self-regulating. Purposive action may constitute on continuity or presentation of continuity, meaning.

The third object is not determined by global-history dimensions; it is coincidental. This is possible because social is contingent; it is principally a coincident that knowledge and social exist. Other worlds of human action are possible and may constitute courses of action – without being social. This constitutes Evil.

Probable knowledge constitutes knowledge at historical, ‘real’ or ‘absolute’ knowledge, even ‘infinite’ knowledge. It is defined through probability in action and constitutes proximity creating social relations. It creates morality and on its continuity social relations. In action – relative certainty - knowledge may be created in historical - empirical - or on probability evaluation based processes. These properties are also at morality and Evil. At any of these forms of relative certainty knowledge may be assumed relative, uncertain, or certain and regulated; there is no necessity into either direction.

Development of probable knowledge is development of Global-dimension. It is conceptually contingent, based on risk. At action and active knowledge it is non-contingent, actually relatively. There are created moral judgements and social relations. Depending on how relative certainty is constituted are created forms of social relations. And if they are not created, is constituted Evil.

It is a mistake to suppose that knowledge contents are separated on dimensions subjectivity – objectivity. There are knowledge objects which constitute contingent, moral and aesthetic knowledge. These are knowledge forms of equal value. Knowledge content is determined inside these conceptual relations into reality.

Knowledge relativity constitutes subjectivity and social processes that are required for knowledge development and knowledge relations which exists in these social processes. On the other hand it is determined in ‘large’ social processes of knowledge development that are not identifiable in the social experience – is it determined extensionally or temporally. Probable knowledge is in social relations never reached; it is an approximation of a limiting value. Social relations are consolidations of probable knowledge. Social action requires that it is considered infinite, certain, and true.
4. Purposive Action

Purposive action and social relations – purposive action’s probable courses – constitute on unlimited but finite number of social acts with arbitrary probabilities. ‘Purposive’ by following conceptual knowledge does not build a block which is followed in action, but every act is singular and based on conceptual relationship into reality, also presupposes social processes, mediation, which create relative certainties; act is not ‘absolutely’ determined by risk and probability relationships and certainty of present is relative. ‘Purposive’ is rather a continuum of relative certainties which build specific properties by contingent social.

By distributions of these probabilities is created courses of social action. Distributions constitute different types of global-history connections, social relations and actually purposive action. By forms of distribution is created forms of relative certainty and social formations. This is at last instance based on identification of social objects - which constitutes on social processes - and depends on the material interaction, its means for mediation of knowledge in transferable - extensive - and continuing - temporal - dimensions.

Means-Ends Relations

Purposive action - or action, a specific type of behaviour – is property of contingent social, also social action. Contingent properties of social constitute on unlimited and finite sets of incidents; unlimited presenting ends set and finite means for their realization. Purposive action is based on risk, as is existence of knowledge. There is no limitation for ends set, they are on this sense coincidental, but the actual course of action depends on means. Means and ends relationship, actual probabilities, build social relations.

There is no meaning to discuss about ends or means separately. They are realized in social sets of incidents where management of conceptual knowledge risk is creating their connections which are realized in types of action. The probability distribution processes managing these relationships determine the properties of action, constitutes their probability and continuity – which may have a life of its own at social interaction. By this development process may be created conceptual relations where are presented ends or means. Individual action does contain such properties only as mediation of social properties of conceptual knowledge.

Building of means-ends relations follows the knowledge probability building processes. Whether unlimited or finite, conceptual or active knowledge, risk or probability is dominating building processes and means-ends relationships are different. At historical probability building conceptual knowledge is dominating and value rationality created. In empirical knowledge processes are defined unique probability match of means and ends and instrumental rationality\(^9\). At probability building processes dominated by global dimensions, risk, is created probable means for ends and manifold probability match of means and ends (Mäkinen, 2012/11, Mäkinen, 2012/16).

Probability building processes create properties for social action and rationality. They are not determined in totalities on global-history connections but action creates social totalities with properties which are conceptual representations,

mediated in action, of type of knowledge universality in specific worlds. They are also properties of knowledge, social identification, responsibility and morality.

Means – ends relationships consider non-contingent selections at non-contingent objects. They are evaluations, selections, in sets of relative certainties, not at contingent objects, probability distributions. In that sense they do not constitute knowledge, but intention. Its reality is however same: probability and continuity of social relations.

‘Means’ or ‘ends’ are properties of social relations. In the global-history continuum sets of incidents are just incidents. ‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are knowledge relations based on development of knowledge and special, contingent social worlds.

Purposive, or intentional, action is means – ends judgements; properties, special ‘meaning’ (Weber) connected to social action where is defined continuity of unlimited and finite probability match.

Meaning and intention are subjective phenomena, also probability properties at action. They have no special reason. They are created at probability building processes and have meaning by social relations continuity.

Rational selections of humans, non-contingent judgements about means and ends, are developed in sets of rational selections where evaluations neither on means nor ends are definite but contingent relations of risk probability between 0 and 1. This probability may not be foundation for actions; these require its presentation as relative certainty. The social relations’ transferability and continuity are determined in a large set of rational selections based on developed knowledge relation. Value or instrumental rationality exists in transferred and continuing social world of acts. Their transference and continuity constitutes on mediation of conceptual knowledge.

When ‘means’ and ‘ends’ are conceptual no singular action does happen according to them, but only by a probability and approximately; the way how action mediates properties which are universal in totality, differentiates the forms of purposive action and rationality. This connection is created at risk management process, also is based on contingent social.

‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are properties of social. Action is a continuum; only in special circumstances, where social, purposive relations exist, it is possible to define means or ends. Principally this is coincidental; other forms of behaviour may exist. Their foundation is a development of historical coincidences. There is no ‘cause’ for means and ends but there is historically developed reasons for certain kind of action (Giddens, 1976, 81 – 86), developed in the process of conceptual knowledge risk management.

10 Levinas asserts knowledge and intention to be definitely separate, even contradictionary: “…relationship to the Wholely other (Tout Autre)... is a relation or religion that is not structured like knowing – that is, an intentionality. Knowing conceals re-presentation and reduces the other to presence and co-presence. Time, on the contrary, in its dia-chrony, would signify a relationship that does not compromise the other’s alterity, while still assuring its non-indifference to ‘thought’” (Levinas,1987a, 31). – And “The objective meaning of my action overrides its intentional signification” (Levinas, 1954/1987b, 31)

11 About concepts ‘purposive’ and ‘intentional’ action see (Mäkinen 2009/14).
Purposive – a Property of Social

Purposive action constitutes the content of wanting and will. Global-history continuum at foundation of social is contingency. Distributions of incidents on it are created by probable courses of action which may have social meaning. Probability of action creates responsibility and morality which are properties of purposive action.

Wanting and non-wanting are social properties created at unlimited and finite world. Their subjective content presupposes relative certainty, also already managed risks. They are based on contingent – unlimited and finite - qualities of social development; specific social constituted on probability building processes. Social communities, structures and networks are forms of social integrity on foundation of properties of wanting; not the grounds for wanting. Meanings of these concepts are determined at courses of action by socially determined probabilities.

Purposive action, intention is peculiar to human action - when it is social. This is conditional and basically coincidence – other forms of behaviour are possible.

On conceptual knowledge, purposive is a reflected relationship to action. “Intention appears to be something that we can express, but which brutes (...) can have, though lacking any distinct expression of intention” (Anscombe, 1957/1963, 5). Intention is mediated conceptually at interaction as specific social properties. Even brutes can communicate by gestures and actions, but they cannot conceptualize them. They have no concept ‘Global’ but communication happens here and now. Conceptualization means continuity and transferability in global-history continuum. Humans’, concepts-making animals’, social specifications are developed in social communication creating concepts that are transferable and continuing.

Subjective ‘end’ at action is free, but to be an end it should have probability. Then it is constituted at continuity of social relations, knowledge relations. Subjective ‘means’ on the other hand are constituted about the probability of this relation where coincidental social issues – objects or incidents – in interaction have social contents at continuity.

Intention, purposive at action is not based on prediction or estimate (Anscombe, 1957/1963, 2); these are properties of contingent knowledge objects. Decisions between means and ends are not factual reasoning and do not change their character whether they are based on ‘complete’ information’ or not; knowledge object is determined at action. Increase of knowledge does influence on this relation only on empirical probability building which applies conditionally.

At purpose, intention, something is wanted subjectively; act is not purposive because it concerns social continuity, or even because its outcome is socially probable, as well as judgement is not moral because it is based on these factors. ‘Wanting’ is at least an act directing to create probability for a social relation. But behaviour does not necessarily constitute on wanting, according to continuity. This applies only at conditions of knowledge relations.

12 “Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, d.i. nach Prinzipen, zu handeln, oder einen Willen” (Kant, 1785/1974, 41).
Prediction is aiming at objective outcome considering historical end; its object is contingent. Intention is aiming at subjective outcome concerning non-contingent object.

**Social Rationality and Integrity**

Social rationality and integrity are based on properties of purposive action, actually social action. This is almost a tautology; only contingent properties of knowledge relations create these phenomena. They are built on knowledge created at probability building processes.

Relationship of means and ends defines the forms of social rationality, value and instrumental rationality. Concept ‘selection’ is central for rationality. When action is governed by instrumental rationality, means are selected by ends. At value rational action actor has opportunity to select certain means to reach various ends. Actor selects the ends that she/he asserts most valuable. In this concept the relationship of means and ends is the criterion for right and wrong decision (Bauman, 1990, 112).

Means and ends are defined as social relations and conceptual knowledge in sets of social incidents. Selections mediating their evaluation have to be interpreted as mediation of by probability developed conceptual knowledge. Types of rationality are corresponded by types of social integrity and on the other hand types of knowledge and morality. Rationality and integrity types also are based on these knowledge and morality properties. They are not instantaneous social forms based on instantaneous selections but probable, continuing social formations. In instrumental rationality there always is a social structure determining unique probability relationship of means and ends.

Selections are rational; they also are social relations, mediation of conceptual knowledge. Singular, historical acts, where selections happen, are coincidental, but based on probable, continuing social relations. When selection is global it is coincidental even as continuing social relationship regarding to selections of other independent social actors. Differences of selections are different relationships of social dimensions at instrumental and value rationality. When is selected means, is acted primarily according to global dimension. Risk is evaluated according to ends from the possible social set of actions, considering historically probable or riskless situations. Value rationality in turn considers risk evaluation of means determined by historically probable ends.

On selections based rationality conception is formal; selection is definitely a developed decision based on developed knowledge which is assumed at least relative certainty. It is not to be identified with purposive action or morality which are based on uncertainty. Morality may be realized only at human action which carries out rationality and integrity type. At them are created limiting values where is based the integrity and the social forms which regulate them

Rationality and integrity constitute on same foundation as purposive action and morality. They should not be considered only as ‘silencing’ or even ‘suppression’ of responsibility (Bauman, 1989/1991, 174, 183, 188 - 192) but on their frames there is possible to consider rational and social integrity constituting also deeds which

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13 “But the commands of written law, the impersonal reason of institutions, despite their origin in free will, become in a certain way alien to the will, which is at every instant renewed” (Levinas, 1953/1987b, 17). These are not probability distributions wich consist social relations at global-history continuum but certain institutionalized formations.
have nothing to do with responsibility or continuity of social relations. Rationality itself does not determine that but its alienation is always possible and in a certain scale happens in every social formation\textsuperscript{14}. From relations of means and ends cannot be assessed anything about morality.

**Change of Rationality and Integrity**

Rationality and integrity carry out the forms of social responsibility. At instrumental rationality they constitute society-type of integrity. It is a special type of social constitution of interaction, not its general constitution. This form changes when knowledge probability building and social responsibility change.

Rationality consists on probability matches of means and ends. Their types depend on the types of matches. If social does not constitute structures where is possible to determine constant relations of global and history, there neither exist a unique probability match of means and ends.

These changes of rationality and integrity are based on morality and responsibility change. Morality has no structural qualities and integrity is based on quite other forms than society. Universality in social totalities constitutes on transferability - not generality - and social formations constitute networks of independent parties where incidents and objects are identified social\textsuperscript{15} (Mäkinen, 2012/16).

Instrumental rationality is connected to the knowledge relations at social structures. It consists economy in the genuine sense, not only production but exchange economy and in the last instance capitalism. These are presuppositions of society-type of integrity; it is essentially economic formation. Its conditions, as definite class structure, authorities and state, do not at global network environment exist as integrity determining social relations\textsuperscript{16}. Society or economy do not necessarily change but they do not constitute integrity; it is constituted at networks – Globalnet - and at welfare maintenance in information society services (Mäkinen, 2012/11, Mäkinen, 2012/16).

\textsuperscript{14} In the last instance this may mean for example: “...it was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which had made the Holocaust-style solution not only possible, but eminently ‘reasonable’ - and increased the probability of their choice” and co-ordinated “the action of great number of moral individuals in the pursuit of any, also immoral, ends” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 18).

\textsuperscript{15} Levinas uses erotic relationship as a prototype of independent ‘Otherness’ (Levinas, 1982/85), 60 – 67). There Beings are two and the other is absolutely Other: “The idea of a love that would be a confusion between two beings is a false romantic idea. The pathos of the erotic relationship is the fact of being two, and that the other is absolutely other” (Levinas, 1982/1985, 66). Also “The relationship with the other ...the erotic relationship furnishes us with the prototype of it” (Levinas, 1987a, 76). - This independent Otherness may serve as the model for global morality which is based only on identification of social and knowledge mediation in it.

\textsuperscript{16} Instrumental rationality requires at least ‘rationality reform’ (Beck, 1994, 31 – 33). In economic sense there exist no relations where is possible to decide what ‘winning’ is (Bauman, 2000, 59 – 61). “It is, rather, the question of considering and deciding, in the face of all risks known or merely guessed, which of the many floating, seductive ends ‘within reach’ (that is, such as can reasonably pursued) offer priority – given the quantity of means in possession and taking into account the meagre chances of their lasting usefulness” (Bauman, 2000, 61). - The question about undefined relationships of means and ends, or probable means and ends, is not empirical, based on the lack of information, but lies in the knowledge itself, the change from generality into transferability.
A set of constant means-ends relationships in a global-history continuum is not possible in the global environment. As there is not possible to determine a correspondence between knowledge components, neither is possible to decide what means are connected to some ends, but these create variable combinations; means are probable means for certain end, not definite means which make possible the reach of end by a probability which is possible to estimate (Mäkinen, 2012/11, Mäkinen, 2012/16).

The integrity constitution of global network is not based on the continuing instrumental social units or structures. Organizations, as for example enterprises, or social structures, as classes, perhaps do not disappear, as did not the emergence of instrumental rationality mean disappearance of traditional communities. These social forms however do not build determining meaningful, continuing social relations, but such are based on networks.

When social action is determined in transferability and continuity of knowledge relation individual, singular acts are coincidental if they are related only to ‘here and now’ and the human who is acting. They are rational and social when they are transferable and continuing. In selecting such social relations in action, human is acting socially.

Purposive or intentional action does not require any explanation; it is a property of social action. Selection which intentional action requires is based on continuity in a large set of social relations. Its generality is based on compatibility with a social dimension. Differences in intentional content differ from each others by relationship of social dimensions.

5. The Social Reality of Morality

Morality and Social

Important question is how things, incidents and objects are knowledge, social and morality; what they are, is a matter of historical reality and constitutes the probability, continuity of determined properties. There is no a priori empirical or other world – as society and history – where issues may be identified on these foundations. Objects are identified in contingent world, or worlds, based on unlimited but finite properties of knowledge risk management. Only identification and its continuity on foundation of probability builds these contents (Mäkinen, 2012/16, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5). The form of identification depends on type of unlimited and finite combinations, risk and probability definitions or social dimensions.

Morality and social are created by identification in these contingent worlds. Responsibility builds the moral characteristics of social relations on foundation of relations probability building. These are properties of interaction.

Identification and resposibility properties are ‘pure’, mere knowledge, social and morality. There is no human nature on which may be based properties of

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17 Identification and responsibility correspond to Levinas conceptions ‘face’ and ‘responsibility’. (See before Levinas, 1982/1985, 95). There is several references in Levinas writings, for example: - Also “...in the communication of knowledge one is found beside Other, not confronted with him”... “existence is the sole thing I cannot communicate” Levinas, 1982/1985, 57). Responsibility is subjective (Levinas, 1982/1985, 95 - 96), probability is objective. The media for objectivity is language and finally social institutions (Levinas, 1982/1987a, 103 – 105).
interaction relations; they are based only on identification of social. Properties like force, power, utility or love are all developed social forms under specific conditions. Interaction relations are based only on unlimited and finite conditions of knowledge; all other suppositions are potential sources of non-knowledge and non-morality.

Identification develops when risk and global dimension of social develop. There is limiting values for unlimited and finite definition of knowledge, as traditional and generalized building of knowledge, or limiting values for social dimensions, as communities, society and history. None of these however has existence outside the conditions of contingent identification development; all other suppositions are potential sources of non-knowledge and non-morality.

Identification has components with different types of proximity and probability. These are based on forms of experience developed in probability building processes. Then “I, ..., experience it (social world) as built around my place in it”. Interaction partners exist as “contemporaries, predecessors and successors” in “manifold forms of intimacy and autonomy, of familiarity and strangeness, of intensity and extensity”. Social interaction is a common space where may be identified the existence of others. They build ‘consociates’ for people. On these relationships is created unique individuality for humans (Schutz, 1962, 15 – 17). Depending on the proximity of social relations build by probability, moral responsibility may also be alienated in social formations.

If ‘given’ consequences, limiting values, for identification exist not or they do not build constant relationships, social relations, morality and responsibility are build on pure ‘Otherness’, absolute independence of interaction partners where exists no historical or structural totalities. This may be called ‘genuine’ responsibility based only on meaningful knowledge mediation; all other forms are developed social relations - which may include the silencing of morality and responsibility.

This relativism which connects morality on interaction “does not apply to human ability to tell right from wrong” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 178); it just means that it is not based on obligation but on contingent properties of social and there developed probability. The idea that obligation is required if idea of social construction is based on isolated subject in infinite world of infinite possibilities to act according to ‘egoistic self’. Such conditions should be determined as relative certainties if there is supposed to be possible to create meaningful knowledge; infinite experience and generalization are not possible. If such conditions are possible to define, also authority and obligation are possible to determine as consequences – or alienation - of moral responsibility, not as its presuppositions. Otherwise there is great probability for non-knowledge creation.

At contingent social incidents and objects are created by probabilities which determine their proximity and moral responsibility content. Solipsism for making human is not possible; knowledge is created only on risks, presupposing existence of identified consociates. These probability distributions are content of morality. Knowledge relations and social reality are created when risks are managed at contingent social courses of interaction. They are not created if these relations are managed by certainty of regulated relations 18.

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18 Levinas asserts that responsibility is not created at relation of two humans where is possible to pardon; justice requires ‘The Third Man’, also social objectivity (Levinas, 1954/1987b, 29 – 37). Actually this, - as idea about ‘mistaken romantic idea’ of owning other human in erotic relationship - means that family or other ‘natural’ relations as the...
Morality and responsibility as social properties of action build probable courses of action at contingent global-history continuum; that is their content. They are knowledge relations, forms of interaction mediated by special forms of probable knowledge. They do either require any explanation as do not special purposive or intentional action; these are social at action. But their forms vary with knowledge relations.

Whatever is supposed about the ‘natural’ state of human, the social state is defined by knowledge relation. It is a developed form of interaction based on contingent knowledge properties. All states of humankind are developed knowledge relations. The natural state of human in social is that of a moral being.

**Moral Judgement**

End is based on possibility of change of social relationships, also risks where social is created. On conditions of social action there is no possibility to analyse ends independently of means; such relation is possible only if exists social structures where means may be defined as separate mediation of conceptual knowledge. Purposive, intentional, action constitutes on moral value and ‘wanting’ something according to it, also an action for an end. Based on continuity of social relations this is a probability at course of action; its moral content is based only on identification and responsibility. The independent moral value of means or ends is possible only subjectively.

Moral judgment is a form of reasoning, however peculiar: “The conceptual connection between ‘wanting’ (...) and ‘good’ can be compared to the conceptual connection between ‘judgement’ and ‘truth’. Truth is the object of judgement, and good is the object of wanting” (Anscombe, 1957/1963, 76, Mäkinen, 2009/14). The object of moral judgement should then be ‘true good’, quality of moral judgement objects. Moral judgment is special quality of knowledge which is not possible to replace by contingent judgments objecting to truth. It should be based on probable continuity of judgment, as also contingent judgment is. This may be considered also as a relationship of means and ends in the sense that they represent the probable courses of social action when that course is based on probable realization of ends by applicable means, where ‘applicable’ is relation at contingent social. – Morality has something to do with the probability of Good over Evil.

If there is a conceptual connection between wanting and good, is it also possible to want something evil? Understood in the context of knowledge relation no action as such is good or evil, but only continuing meaningful action may have these properties. Also ‘evil’ is social reality, knowledge, or non-knowledge, mediation at conceptual relations. The logical type of social action according to meaning is action foundation of society is a romantic dream. Complexity of social relations by risk at knowledge relations instead is its foundation.

19 Also state of war and state of peace: “Der Friedenszustand unter Menschen, die neben einander leben, ist kein Naturzustand (status naturalis), der vielmehr ein Zustand des Krieges ist... Es muß also gestiftet werden” (Kant, 1795/1977, 203). – ‘Natural’ state, is it war or something else, does not build social and on it is not created any necessary or even necessarily probable human development. ‘Gestifted’ in relation to ‘natural state’, is morality. ‘Legislated’ in societal sense is regulated certainty which cannot be identified with morality.

20 This is principally same argument as Levinas on knowledge and intention as definitely separate issues (see before).
directing to ‘good’ – a continuous social relation. Evil may be understood as a deviation from this but not on conditions of social relations’ relative certain approximations but at knowledge probability distributions in relation to contingent knowledge properties\(^{21}\).

On relative certainty this may be interpreted categorically like: “... we should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offends that consciousness. We do not condemn it because it is a crime, but it is crime because we condemn it” (Durkheim, 1893/1984, 40). By those conditions morality is produced in ‘society factory of morality’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 170 – 175). Society - its logical type - is considered moral, it controls and condemns bad; instead that it would be based on incongruity of good and bad, on uncertainty of judgment and probable knowledge. In the first case it would be limited but infinite, in the last unlimited but finite. Social is created by wanting Good, not its presupposition. But creation of social is not necessary at human interaction, only probable - by some probability which is determined at identification and continuity. - Problem is how creation of knowledge, social and morality is more probable than creation of non-knowledge, non-social and non-moral.

In the case where morality is assumed to be regulated by society there should already exist developed social structures and institutions on whose constitution morality has no role. It may be based on development of society’s maintenance (Marx), development of division of labour and on it based functional dependence (Durkheim) but it also lets room for heroic or wild guesses about human nature. Only existence of society, its structures and institutions confirms morality and deviation from moral responsibility is evaluated according to them; each society has a morality it needs (Bauman, 1989/1991, 172).

Probable knowledge is presented at historical knowledge and social moral principles are historical, contingent formations; any social formation does not constitute their necessity. In relative certainty and on it constituted institutional formations moral judgements are not relative. Relativity of moral judgements is presented at knowledge relations and in social processes where they are developed. On the other hand it is determined in ‘large’ social processes that are realized only approximately at ‘consolidated’ social structures. Necessary or even high probability moral judgement is in social relations never reached. Then it is impossible to condemn by necessity or morally but only by regulated right, always in a sense by ‘right of power’. Power is not created at morality level. It is created when limiting values of risk and probability definitions are created by traditional, structural or network (global) probability building. Society has not morality it needs but regulation it needs; it is social limiting value, which may be good or bad or contain elements of both.

It is reasonable to argue that the moral act maintains continuous social relations and morally deviating act is deviating from that continuity; morality is more probable and continuing than non-morality. But it is different thing if continuity is build on unlimited and finite world with risk or on a relative certainty between two people or already continuous – ‘consolidated’ – social relations; the first one is creation processes for knowledge and morality, the other one their maintenance, which also includes suppression of both. These are same issues only if creation of

\(^{21}\) This deviation may be understood on context of ‘ideal type’ defined by Max Weber (Weber, 1921/1976, Mäkinen, 2008/12). It is an explanation model. It is based on a meaningful - also at knowledge relation continuing - logical type of social action. Its objective is to explain historical deviations from the action compatible with the ideal type.
continuing forms of social responsibility build constant formations based on logical construction of action on supposition that there is necessary relation between morality and means-ends relations at unique correspondence - probability match. Then moral responsibility and its social limiting value are identified. And good ends and good means create good society. This is a very improbable special case and may be possible only at traditional community or social structure. Deviations from moral judgements creating social formations are relative – moral or immoral by probability - when they are based on knowledge relations where are not developed social knowledge relations of unique probability match at continuous, probable, social relations.

The development of probable knowledge is based on development of Global-dimension of social. Whatever continuity does not build a social relation, but only responsible social action that determines the non-contingent knowledge and social object. That may realize in several forms, as for example instrumental rationality; it does not presuppose dominance of values in action. Also instrumental rationality has a special content which does not for example include principle “the ends sanctify the means”.

When act is moral it is realized at probability statements about non-contingent objects at conditions for knowledge building, also relative certainties which build special cases in contingent social whatever it is; building dominating social form is a special case. If something is ‘wanted’, the object is value, ‘good’. It is based on knowledge relation and has properties of purposive action and may be morally evaluated also as relation of means and ends. And ‘evil’ is not wanted, it more or less ‘happens’, is coincidental. It has continuity, and end, in relative certainty which does not build contingent social and cannot be described by concepts that may be interpreted knowledge in the moral sense; also probable social continuity as responsibility and proximity. These ends may however be interpreted foundation for purposive action in some social relations that build continuities of their own.

This may be determined only regarding relative certainty and on it constituted social continuities. At the social relation continuity level there is not possible to determine any ‘good’ or ‘bad an sich’, but they are probability distributions of social continuity. This is developing contingent properties on foundation of conceptual knowledge risk management in the same risk and probability foundation as knowledge generally develops. When a formulated moral judgement is created, it is a matter of social acceptance, a kind of ‘social contract’ (Rousseau, 1762/1968).

In special conditions finite dimensions and contingency at sets of rational selections build established, consolidated institutions, which determine their form of continuity. Acting according to them does not as such mean the moral judgement and selection. Moral judgement is subjective and principally coincidental, ‘free’. Action supposed according to social continuity of consolidated institutions - whether presupposition is to attend legislation, pursue after effectiveness or profit or activity and thinking forms presupposed by some ideology - may be moral and may be not.

Generalized law is not universal, universal is on probability based individual action. If is supposed to follow the law it is probable moral action. Coincidental is meaningful; there exist properties, which constitute meaning, also probability, continuity, responsibility, morality. Meaningful are probability distributions, not consolidated laws.
Ivan Karamazov

Moral judgements are contingent; they have same qualities as social totalities constituted on unlimited and finite properties. They are not valid in infinite worlds; in social based on knowledge relation such does not exist. But its object is infinite world in the sense of non-contingent world at conditions where knowledge relations can be created.

Ivan Karamazov (F.M. Dostojevski: The Brothers Karamazov) is concerned with the problem of existence of moral if there exist no infinite authority where moral may be based on. For Ivan this is a matter of human reflection and concern.

That is the moral judgement. Uncertainty is its property – although must constitute relative certainty at action.

For Smerdjakov this is not a matter of human reflection and concern. He considers Ivan’s suspicion and concern and makes a decision that if infinite God does not exist, everything is permissible. Then exist no virtue, and is neither needed (Достоевский, 1880/2001, 646). Smerdjakov murders Ivan's, and his own, father.

Ivan asks for categorical authority. Such is never the mere responsibility at social interaction, but developed social forms which on some probability are moral, on some immoral – like Grand-Inquisitor (Достоевский, 1880/2001, 254 – 273). Just Ivan’s suspicion and questioning is morality.

Morality cannot be certainty; it is based on relative certainty at action which represents ‘reasonable’ – also tested in a way or an other - probability for social responsibility. Morality understands what social and responsibility are. State, ideologies, legislation do not understand because they presuppose certainty; they are approximations of action; they constitute society. Interaction constitutes social. From the certainty of relative certainty are constructed social rules, ideologies and religions; from its relativity morality and humanism.

Uncertainty is objective, based on risk, existence of complex social relations. It can be changed to certainty on conditions for unique probability building but only by silencing probability. This creates moral action and non-moral action - both by unpredictable probability. There is minor certainty that probability for non-moral is smaller than for moral action.

Responsibility in structural relations, as knowledge relations and rationality types, means that there exits an integrity type called ‘society’ and its institutions, government, legislation. At historical relations it constitutes communities and perhaps Gods or God. The individual responsibility means responsibility as property of action without separate social relations creating integrity. Network integrity constitutes not on such separate relations but may have social dimensions on foundation of probable connections.

Global relations are not grounded on individual responsibility but they are it, also based on risk and uncertainty. Social at them is as such responsibility and justice. This may be called humanity in the only sense this concept means - relations where people are being together.

In knowledge relations infinite authorities or social regulations are historical social facts. Promoting such facts into the status of infinite truth is part of common social
life. So are also smerdjakovs’ refusing it in an ‘infinite’ way. Such social facts may be for example religion or state. These propositions bind individuals – and especially bind necessarily - only in social life. Moral judgements are probability distributions at continuing social relations and always sources of human reflection and concern.

Behind general laws is not possible to hide if they are not moral - and general is never.

6. The Moral Judgement and Knowledge Development

Knowledge probability building may constitute several objects of knowledge by forms of experience and interaction. There also is no a priori environment of knowledge where is possible to proclaim that some knowledge forms are indispensable and passing over all other forms. On the other hand every knowledge and probability form is built in social processes depending on unlimited and finite properties of knowledge.

The change of rationality and integrity by probability building means also objective foundation for morality change; and actually also change of judgment of art; everlasting exists not. For evaluation of these knowledge and action forms is important to define their inception, death and the form of social responsibility they maintain and the depth of that maintenance. Humanism is responsibility but it has different forms depending on the forms where knowledge is created, developed, transferred and secured.

‘Ought’ and ‘Is’

From facts cannot be deduced moral judgements; moral judgement is not based on empirical data or generalization; from what is cannot be deduced what ought to be (Hume’s guillotine)\(^\text{22}\).

There is a logical gap between contingent and moral judgments; they have distinct objects. But these objects are created at social processes. Development of knowledge relation changes the foundation, building processes and objects of contingent and moral judgements. This is social fact which can be explained. Moral judgements are not and cannot be created independently of social relationships into

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\(^\text{22}\) Hume’s guillotine is formulated for example: "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (Hume, 1739-1740/1969, 521, also 507 – 521 ‘Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason’). – As influential formulation, where elation of saying perfectly overrides analytics: “If we take in our hand any volume - of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance – let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume, 1748/1964, 135).
The real problem at question is not are moral judgements verified by factual, contingent reasoning, but they are moral because they are not verified that way; knowledge they anyhow are and verified. Moral judgements concern different objects of probable knowledge than contingent, factual reasoning.

Moral judgements are neither subjective inventions. All probable knowledge, which moral judgements are, is based on experience. Experience constitutes on continuing, meaningful social processes, where presuppositions for knowledge building is risk management of conceptual knowledge - in a way or another. Experience is a relationship of observing subject into reality only coincidently; there knowledge is not build. In every case – is question about contingent knowledge concerning nature or humanity, or moral judgement – experience is based on concepts developed in the social processes for development of knowledge, conceptual relationships into reality.

This presupposes first development of spatiotemporal context for knowledge, then other concepts related to knowledge objects. There exist several spatiotemporal relationships or relationships of global and history. Experience regarding ‘facts’ and interaction regarding ‘ought’ are such relationships, among others. Social development, the management of conceptual knowledge risk, resolves which one is dominant. But the form of knowledge relation regarding human action must be same in every relationship of global and history: meaning regarding action. Change in relationship of global and history explains the existence and change of moral judgements, but not their content.

The existence of knowledge and action are identical with the existence of moral judgements. Social reality is finite. ‘Brutes’ (Anscombe) are not intentional and do not have moral, religion or economy. These are properties of contingent knowledge relations. These concepts, intention, moral, and concrete social phenomena religion, society, economy, do belong together. Experience where moral judgements are based is created on developed knowledge relation where concepts, theories and experience regarding all kinds of knowledge exist. Empirical facts have no characteristics that should make them more consummate than moral judgements.

Contingent, Moral and Aesthetic Judgement

Increase of knowledge does not result into unique type of knowledge; knowledge consists of building and development processes which produce different knowledge forms. Idea of increasing knowledge is usually connected into empirical conception of knowledge and on these frames ‘super-knowledge’ is of course empirical knowledge which is identified to scientific. This does not hold because knowledge is dependent on its object; it is always conceptual relationship into reality, starting from determination of incidents by spatiotemporal concepts. On these connections knowledge is constituted on different types of judgments which are not possible to derive from each other but are connected to the types of social interaction.

By object there is defined three types of judgements: contingent, moral and aesthetic judgment. Contingent objects are defined by unlimited and finite
qualities for social. On these conditions there is possible to determine objective social processes where the truth value of judgments is possible to validate, to define the rules for judgments validation – but judgments are always more likely, only probabilities. These judgments may be called scientific and the communities following their rules scientific community[^25].

Moral judgment is determined at non-contingent object on the conditions which are possible to determine at framework of contingent social. It is based on relative certainty at action and may consist world which is ‘absolute’, also constituted for example on constant connection of social dimensions or supposes properties to be valid in general sense. Its object may be infinite, but it must be determined by the conditions of contingent social, also its object is limited, which makes possible the creation of knowledge. For example supposition of ‘economic man’ or utility as properties of ‘human nature’ may constitute moral judgments because there is possible to determine in a reasonable way the conditions where social generalizations – by probability enough – about human action is made. These are however not contingent objects if they suppose that these properties concern ‘human nature’ in general and do not take into account its development in social.

For aesthetic judgments or judgments of art - or a general ability for making judgments - special object is, according to Kant, purposive properties (Zweckmäßigkeit. Kant, 1790/1974) of world. In social this would mean purposive action (Zwecktätigkeit, Habermas, 1981) qualities and their constitution at social relations, also the meaning of knowledge conceptualizing social world, and the ability to make judgements for determination of that meaning. The only meaning[^26] in social relations is probable continuity of contingent social, also its unlimited but finite properties and their change. The content of subjective is to understand meaning and purposive or the meaning of incidents. As there is no reason to ask what is moral, but why it is moral, there either is reason to ask what art, beauty and love are, but why they are art, beauty and love.

Difference of contingent and moral judgements’ objects is based on conceptual relationships into reality which are forms of experience. The processes for too narrow concept. Perhaps concept for ability of ‘purposive judgment’ or power of judgment (Kant ‘Urteilskraft’) would define best the ideas objected.

[^24]: This has connection into Kant’s definition of three kinds of judgments: reinen Vernunft (Kant, 1781/1971), praktischen Vernunft (Kant, 1789/1974) and Urteilskraft (Kant, 1790/1974). These types of judgments are defined for example: "Die Naturbegriffe, welche den Grund zu allem theoretischen Erkenntnis a priori enthalten, beruhten auf der Gesetzgebung des Verstandes. – Der Freiheitsbegriff, der den Grund zu allen sinnlich-unbedingetenn praktischen Vorschriften a priori enthielt, beruhte auf der Gesetzgebung der Vernunft... in der Familie der oberen Erkenntnisvermögen gibt es doch noch ein Mittelglied zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft. Dieses ist die Urteilskraft" (Kant, 1790/1974, 84 – 85, see also 15, 74). In knowledge relation context aesthetic, judgment of art is the most subjective: it is not supposed that somebody is accepting the judgment as in the case of moral, but judgment has its status when it is subjective and evaluated only by its object’s qualities. But it must be continuing: if there is no interaction, it disappears. At contingent or aesthetic judgment meaning is not a relative certainty at action; solitude is the main, if not only, property of meaningful knowledge.

[^25]: Here is presented qualities of scientific judgments actually on foundation of social sciences. It is however apparent that same qualities are possible to determine also in other sciences; they handle contingent objects and their ‘laws’ are probabilities.

[^26]: Here is taken any position on purposive properties of nature ("Die Urteilskraft mach es, ..., außer der mechanischen Naturnotwendigkeit sich an ihr auch eine Zweckmäßigkeit zu denken..." (Kant, 1790/1974, 32)). Not even if such do exist or not and if exist what on earth such would mean. They are perhaps possible to define by same principles as in social sciences.
knowledge validation or reliability depend on objects but processes as such, historical phenomena, do not have principal differences. These conditions are identical; processes are specified as interaction regarding knowledge relation objects. The objects defined in scientific knowledge relation are contingent, in moral judgements' they are not. When knowledge relation is identical with the form of interaction, also the processes for scientific – or theoretical, and moral – or practical - development of knowledge do differ. The scientific method requires its foundation on experience by rules of 'scientific community'. So do moral judgements – in their communities. There are no a priori, immediate forms for experience building but it constitutes on properties connected with the contingent objects of knowledge.

Moral judgements are subjective, even when continuing; only individual activity is moral. Organization, institution, or government acting morally or immorally exist not but depending on type of responsibility, also social meaning and continuity, and on it based rationality, individual action may have properties, moral or immoral, which constitute social relations at these formations – and of course when these formations are consolidated they may also oblige or force forms of action. Subjectivity is not a principal difference with moral and scientific judgement. Any historical process for knowledge development has ‘objective’ character based on transferability, but its development is made by humans. When the process for acceptance is determined by the knowledge objects, objectivity is reached only on a continuing process that can create acceptable probability. With infinite object cannot be any than subjective solutions - or their continuity depending on some supposed external authority. Other concepts may be based on empirical generalizations which can never validate non-contingent objects. At contingent objects, and interaction forms based on them, it is possible to reach objectivity – although it never happens.

At means-ends relationships ends are created by transferability dimension and means on their probability building. The infinite object - in the sense of non-contingent - of moral judgement is continuing with purposive action but not being the ends of action; its continuity consist of by probability – also means – determined ends. Scientific judgements may be ‘used’ in purposive action for its probability determination by means. In these judgments contingent judgments may be part of moral judgments but ability of means-ends relations do not determine moral judgments or constitute their criteria27.

When the object of judgement is non-contingent it is subjective and activity according to it purposive, based on ends fastened. The end is a form of knowledge that is subjective, principally impossible to verify at interaction constituting about conceptual risk management. End is not created from nothing, but from an non-contingent object of knowledge that is not possible to determine on dimensions of

27 The condition of means-ends relation sip as criterion for morality is possible only on unique probability match of means and ends where means are determined by ends: “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, ..., must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, ... of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it” (Mill, 1861/1972, 2). - See also "... in both (forms of rationality) the means are measured against the ends and their mutual fit, ..., is seen as the ultimate criterion in the choice between right and wrong decision" (Baumann, 1990, 112). - If the social end of action is supposed to be "the greatest happiness principle, ..., utilitarian arguments are indispensable" (Mill, 1861/1972, 3). On these starting points of unique probability match it is possible to suppose that the principle of everyone’s happiness creates the happiness of all.
knowledge that may be described ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’. ‘Subjective end’ is determined at knowledge object and interaction process connected with it.

Under these consequences action has a subjective meaning. It is however possible only on continuing social relationships, not in any singular acts. This is a form of knowledge transferability at probable history.

Objects of aesthetic judgments are not possible to determine at reasoning based on relationships of ‘reality’ and knowledge at relative certainties or continuing probable social relations or want to assert someone about these. If they present the meaning of incidents they are subjective, although based on unlimited and finite constitution of knowledge and social. Meaning may be realized only at actual action, as probability always; probability is pure and mere meaning and subjectivity. Aesthetic judgments are ‘near’ or comparable to contingent judgments when they do not constitute on external reasons - are they ends or means.

Purposive judgments are based on universal properties of contingent objects, “…Dinge nach einer Regel, aber nicht nach Begriffen, zubeurteilen (Kant, 1790/1974, 105). They are knowledge when they mediate social action but do not purpose to describe objective or universal relationships into reality. They are purposive judgments without purpose28.

Knowledge objects determine processes where judgments are done. On them is always connected communities whose practices and procedures produce judgments, and specific qualities of social practices29. These communities have to communicate with other communities; they must have ‘audience’. These processes however do not determine the properties of judgments, what ever the judgment type is. It is based on judgment’s object which on its turn is determined by unlimited but finite properties of knowledge and social.

When based on contingent properties, all types of judgments do depend on probability building processes of knowledge and there constituting responsibility and social. None is everlasting and there is no object – social or other – which may determine them, not even natural because they are conceptual relationships into reality. Eternal questions about reality, morality or aesthetics exist not30.

**Unity of Judgments and Social**

28 “Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie, ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks, an ihm wahrgenommen wird” (Kant, 1790/1974, 155, also 134, 193)
29 For example information security is social practice which is comparable to scientific community’s rules for creating meaningful knowledge (Mäkinen, 2012/10).
30 Morality and art have in common that both are degenerating and paralyzing depending on how they understand humanity and social, especially on suppositions of their eternal ‘nature’. - Houellebecq (1994) asserts that in society exist two equal power systems – the one, masculine, based on money, and other, feminine, based on sexuality. They have in common that both lead into absolute exploitation and deprivation. Perhaps true - but only on conditions of instrumental and structural conception of human nature and social. This may be valid concerning 18'th and 19'th century English and French petty bourgeoisie - limited worlds for these conceptions’ inception. If culture or art are attached with these conceptions they rather have no other future than the desperate assessments of Grand Moralists - like human as an unsuccessful and perishing species which should be replaced by artificial human (Houellebecq, 1998 and 2005) or killing a quota of rich people to get room for goodness and beauty (Aki Kaurismäki, Interview, Hattenstone, 2012).
It is not a social scientific question to reason about the origin of morality, aesthetics or social; they build a world. When is said that “… whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence” (Hume, 1739-1749/1969, 126) or “there must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect” (Hume, 1739-1749/1969, 223, also Hume, 1748/1964, 24 - 27), then is required that the contiguous and sequential relationships of cause and effect are defined. Conceptions of time and space connected to empirical knowledge are one knowledge relation, not the only adequate conceptions of existence.

The argumentation about relationships of cause and effect is valid on knowledge relation at empirical probability building for knowledge about incidents - at social on incidents’ historical connections. The properties of social are based on knowledge relations at global-history continuum; they cannot be explained by inception from a cause but as contingent properties of that continuum and their historical forms by risk management processes based on contingency.

The fixed relationship of cause and effect presupposes a proposition of existence connected with singular, empirical, historical things. It is not reasonable to presuppose some ‘greater’ realities, as ‘social totalities’, which exist independently of social action. But incidents presuppose that they have spatiotemporal dimensions; they are conceptual relations into reality. Social action is social only when it has dimensions Global and History, based on risk and probability. Concept ‘existence’ is based on knowledge relation defining these dimensions. These are real properties and real in social is knowledge.

The question about origin and inception of moral judgements, aesthetics and social relations may arise only if global and history is interpreted according to their fixed connection and its historical continuity. Such a question does not exist before the creation of instrumental rationality and society form of integrity, and does not survive after them. Universal conceptual relationships into reality presuppose risk management of conceptual knowledge as special social processes indicating the contingent properties of social world.

If it is required a ‘cause’ for moral, aesthetics or social, it may be some ‘extraterrestrial’ subject (or “If infinite God does not exist, everything is permissible”). Otherwise its foundation lies at the subjective properties of human, which is as far ‘infinite’ and ‘extraterrestrial’ suppositions than the former one.

When moral or aesthetic judgements are not possible to derive from empirical facts, but anyhow exist, it is possible to suppose that they are connected a priori into ‘Reason’, a sort of ‘laws of thought’. The only sense this can be interpreted is that they are developed forms of probable knowledge. They are not generally accepted even as knowledge and more unlikely accepted as morally or artistic binding. But when they exist as knowledge, it is not required to question them by propositions about risks.

This is based on subjective rationality but connected to social continuity that may be developed into social relations or into a moral and aesthetic ‘systems of thought’, clearly formulated and conceptualized or only practically followed. If judgements do not develop in such a way, there rather exists any probable knowledge or knowledge relation. Moral judgements, purposive action, their subjective ends and acting according to socially accepted principles do belong.
together. “Wanting” is acting according to principles; even according to Good or Art\textsuperscript{32}. They are also compatible with ‘free will’, subjective rationality of action\textsuperscript{33}. This is a knowledge relation.

7. The Social Reality of Evil

“...Holocaust was a window, rather than a picture on the wall. Looking through that window, one can catch a rare glimpse of many things otherwise invisible” (Bauman, 1989/1991, viii)

“И именно теперь, опрокидывая Гегелев закон, в пору торжества государственной мощи над свободой человека, подготовляется русскими мыслителями в лагерных ватниках высший принцип всемирной истории: 'Все бесчеловечное бессмысленно и бесполезно’ ...’Да, да, да, во времена полного товжества бесчеловечности стало очевидно, что все созданное насилием бессмысленно и бесполезно, существует без будущего, безследно\textsuperscript{34} (Гроссман, 1963/1994, 374)

Social Evaluation of Morality

As we need global network to understand properties of knowledge, we need a window into the Evil to understand it; a system or systems which obviously – on our whole experience – represent Evil\textsuperscript{35}. When Evil evidently is social by nature (Bauman, 1989/1991, 166 – 168) it - as all properties of social - is based on knowledge relations and human action – or non-knowledge and non-social built at social processes. Its social nature does not mean that Evil would be property of social systems influencing on the behaviour of human beings or determining it; its properties are in knowledge creation processes. These starting points for investigations of systems representing Evil are important because there social properties exist at ‘ennobled’ form as results of mature probability building processes. Phenomena are more apparent than at simple interaction.

If assumption about probability controlled social based on interaction holds true there exist processes creating properties which are related to social but exist outside the contingent knowledge creation, responsibility and continuing social relations. Incidents are not Evil by probability but they are probable Evil\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{32} It is also reasonable to connect purposive action and moral judgement into duty and following laws, as “...eigentlich aus Pflicht geschehe und also einen moralischen Wert habe” (Kant, 1785/1974, 33). And this is a property of social action and only its.

\textsuperscript{33} "Die Autonomie des Willens ist das alleinige Prinzip aller moralischen Gesetze und der ihnen gemäßten Pflichten’” (Kant 1788/1974, 144).

\textsuperscript{34} “And just now, when might of government was revelling its triumph over human freedom Russian thinkers in quilted jackets of camp prisoners were preparing the highest principle of world history, which will overrule the Hegelian law: ‘All inhuman is unreasonable and useless’... Yes. At the absolute triumph of inhumanity became apparent, that everything created by violence is unreasonable and useless, without future, disappears – without trace” (‘Forever Flowing’, Grossman, 1963/1994, 374). – Compare: "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig” (Hegel, 1821/1968, 39).

\textsuperscript{35} "And if it is true that in the final stages of totalitarianism an absolute evil appears (absolute because it can no longer be deduced from humanly comprehensible motives), it is also true that without it we might never have known the truly radical nature of the Evil” (Arendt, 1951, ix).

\textsuperscript{36} The idea about “parallel properties, analogies, on social and individual levels” should not be connected to this. At least such would presuppose social structures where parallelism occurs. On such conditions it is possible to argue that structures are influencing on
There is no criteria for morality and goodness; we are born on and from them. There is no social origin of morality; social is morality. Social exists because Good is more probable than Evil. Morality is probability at contingent social. If at action are not realized the requirements of contingent social then is created probable Evil.

There is either absolute criteria for Evil; other than antagonism for morality based on existence of contingent knowledge, contingent social and contingent human responsibility. All other criteria are possible to confuse and relativize - make even killing of people justified 'depending on circumstances'. More reasonable than developing criteria for Evil is to evidence that - and why - Good is more probable than Evil. It is not reasonable to discuss which form of Evil is most evil, but how they arise, how they die and how deeply they can corrupt social and human beings. And first of all: how it is possible to make people to do atrocities?

History of 20'th century Europe offers the most valuable window into Evil in history; rational killing comparable to Second World War and development preceding it has never happened - and will never happen, because Good is more probable than Evil.

It seems to be a modern intellectual virtue to put Nazism and Stalinism into the same historical cage of Evil. For a reason or another there are not put terror bombardments in Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, overwhelming of Wilhelm Gustloff at Baltic Sea or atombombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. - The ends do not sanctify the means? And relationship of ends and means seems to have differences depending on who are behind them; justice accompanies the sword of Winner (Väinö Linna).

All these incidents are suppression, silencing, exploitation or in best case redirection of morality (Bauman, 1989/1991, 174, 183, 188 - 192). There are no differences in killing or ranking orders for means-ends relations; if these atrocities are not in same cage, there is differences for good and bad creation on their course. They are not same processes for creating or suppressing morality and social; they do not arise or die in same ways and have no same influences on social life. These functions - of actually social governments’ - are not moral, as functions of systems never are. They are all modern, instrumental rationality and forms of social integrity type ‘society’ – achievements of social development never reached before and creating Evil in scale never happened before. But it is still reasonable to argue that they have differences on Evil - and even more: if these deeds or perpetrators are identified to each other is made a historical mistake which may prevent to prevent inhumanity.

When morality is social probability and responsibility differences on morality and Evil are at creating social.

There is no possibility to argue that ends are good but means bad, or ends are bad but means good, or both are bad or good. There are no ends without means or means without ends. As knowledge exists only at human interaction, by probability, any ends do not exist without realization at means. On the other hand there is only a minor possibility that on them can be presented a unique relationship. Evil may be created when means and ends are separated and knowledge about their connection is not developed. The evaluation of this requires large social processes – which simple means-ends relationships hardly are. Means may exist in independent individuals or constituted on individual deeds. Either is probable only if unique connections at social exist. There is no reason to suppose that such relations would be immediate or unique. Otherwise properties which are build at individual action, its probabilities and relative certainties and moral judgments, may be mediated socially for building social.
The criteria for morality may be seen ‘Human as End in itself’. This is not possible; probability, reality is created only at connection of means and ends, probable courses of social action. Otherwise we cannot create knowledge and if it is not created, we cannot constitute social action. Properties of human, human nature, which should live outside interaction are always generalizations at limited conditions and if those conditions are experienced infinite, they may generate immoral action. Human as ‘end in itself’ may generate Nazism as well as humanism.

Evil has social origin but not – only - in silencing morality; Evil constitutes on properties of social action. Social integrity types are forms of moral responsibility. If – and when – they produce immorality, this is property of social action and responsibility; alienation of morality is it. Social exist only because Good is more probable than Evil. The only question of universal humanity is: Why and at which conditions? – This may be formulated also: How is social development constituted when it creates Good more probable than Evil?

Instrumental rationality seems to produce greatest prosperity to humankind. And the greatest Evil; Holocaust and Stalinism are deeply grounded into it. Evil comes in, is created only when it is presumed necessary; that is social nature of Evil. Probability of assumed necessity increases when there exists a unique probability match of means and ends. There may be whatever opinions of human and social development, but they are under discussion - if they are not necessities. In humanism and morality are no necessities.

Ability ‘to tell right from wrong’ must be ‘grounded in something other than the conscience collective of society’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 178). It is circumstance where morality is given, necessary. But there is no reason why it conscience collective would not be presupposed immorality. Morality evaluation is possible when the conditions for knowledge creation are defined. Life and dead of morality is dependent on this.

Morality and immorality must be evaluated in larger processes than means-ends relations. Judgments about building humanity and its realization are based on large
social processes. Their foundation in knowledge building processes may be foundation for morality evaluation. The ‘laws’ of social development create the conditions for morality where social integration is based on. They create also Evil. When its evaluation is not given by some authority or based on subjective ‘opinions’ of people, Evil has forms which are based on development of knowledge and social and which may be evaluated at that development.

Social Non-Identification

Social constitutes on identification of objects as social, constituted by processes where identification happens; it exists not a priori or immediately based on experience. Identification constitutes on probability at action, it has no external source which would make it automatic. Identification as probable social processes is same issue as constitution of social dimensions; the principal condition of identification processes is creation concepts for Global and History. Contingent properties for incidents identification create social. Probability of Good over Evil is based on creation of social identification at contexts of contingent social. This is probability of contingent social, its property based on development of knowledge relation.

Proximity at social relations is subjective responsibility based on probability of identification. Management of social risks constitutes proximity; categories like ‘contemporaries, successors, predecessors, consociates’ (Shutz). Presupposition for Evil is breaking down these relations, also breaking down the constitution of probability of contingent social. It does not happen automatically but must be made. Identification is based on mediation of social processes and so is non-identification. Their differences are to be defined by properties and probability of these processes. Both should have their foundation at interaction; possibility of Evil lies in interaction itself, at probable Evil.

The non-identification for alienation of objects in social and the suppression of morality in social relations’ foundation on contingent social is property of social rationality. The types of rationality are corresponded to types of social integrity - also the types of objective representation, approximation, by probability developed limiting values of subjective responsibility. Instrumental rationality supports the processes for creating social distance - in the sense of risk existence and identification. It is based on separate existence of means and ends at social structures. On these conditions properties of human action may be determined by properties of social structures. When at instrumental rationality means–ends probability match is supposed unique, these actually structural properties may be presented necessary; necessary events are required for morality suppression by

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39 Identification consists actually on three components: identification, authentication and non-repudiation (CommonCriteria V3.1, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5, Mäkinen, 2012/16). At global network these are possible only by technical means and probability.

40 Bauman asserts that presupposition for Nazism was overcoming the images of the ‘Jew next door’, the victims should be ‘psychologically invisible’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 187, 25). Human is demonized, as form of non-identification, for creation of Evil. Demonizing human is common feature to all forms of anti-humanism or totalitarianism, to Stalinism and Nazism still common on instrumental rationality based rational killing. Demonizing presupposes a label; it is not a social process: Nazism makes Jews not human and Stalinism kulaks (кулак) (Гроссман, 1963/1994, 330); Nazism is demonizing on ground of natural guilt and Stalinism on statistical guilt.

41 If morality is ‘grounded in something other than the conscience collective of society’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 178), not on ‘society as factory of morality’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 170-175) so is actually its suppression; society and societal cannot either be events from open air for creation of immoral behaviour.
social order. Instrumental rationality forms may be justified as actions of society, loyalty for it.

Instrumental rationality offers great probability for morality suppression, which makes understandable that on it is created the greatest Evil thus far known. But it is itself a form of responsibility and morality – and especially foundation for society as form of integrity in more profound way than any other type of rationality. It also creates obviously different degrees of Evil; in any case however do not ends sanctify the means. There is social consequences and processes where social is realized in different properties of morality, and also in different properties of social knowledge and interaction – also at creation of social identification. These are not created by considering everybody as 'pure, mere human' in society or 'member of humanity'. These differences do not depend on properties of identified but identification.

If and when social is based on probable contingent relations constituting subjective responsibility and proximity, it is a special problem if “totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals” (Arendt, 1951, 316). Such do not appear automatically but they must be created. These creation processes are historical incidents but they have conditions based on historical probabilities at same time when they break historical continuity of instrumental rationality created social relations and institutions. Moral indifferencemust be produced socially by probable conditions – greatest Evil by greatest resources of modernity - but it requires breaking history and probability and producing a 'road clean' sign (Bauman, 1989/1991, 18 – 27, 104 – 106, 113- 114).

Jezovtshina is a principal process – an ideal type (Weber, 1921/1976, Mäkinen, 2008/12) - for creating social non-identification. It is focused on social relations where identities are created and transferred. At 1937 it was a presupposition for Stalinist form of totalitarianism. Its effect – and perhaps reason, if such concept is possible at circumstances where development is based on long history of irrational conditions – was paralyzing the administrative and intellectual capacity of society. Stalinists did not kill for killing – as Nazis to eliminate Jews – but to eliminate the social groups which would danger the realization of totalitarianism. It is not based on interests of society in general, but on interests of elite and mob; all the others must be obliged. Social groups cannot be obliged by killing but by propaganda and

42 There is differences of non-identified alienation of social objects at Nazism and Stalinism, and “a pilot delivering the bomb to Hiroshima or to Dresden, to excel in the duties assigned at guided missile base, to design ever more devastating specimens of nuclear warheads – and all this without detracting from one’s moral integrity and coming anywhere near moral collapse” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 26). - Moreover ‘without detracting from one’s moral integrity’ it is possible for ‘the victorious perpetrators of the Gulag and Hiroshima ...bringing to trial, condemning and convicting the vanquished perpetrators of Auschwitz’ (Bauman, 1989/1991, 210).

43 Jezovtshina (see for example Ежовщина, www.yandex.ru) has got its name from Nikolai Jezov, Sovjetunion’s commissar in internal affairs at 1937 when Stalin arranged the elimination of old party, governmental, military and civilization elites; at 1937 360 000 people were killed (Englund, 1996, 61). On foundation of Jezovtshina was created a new elite ‘1938 class’ constituting of ‘young, until idiotism loyal men of career’ (Englund, 1996, 87, See also Grossman, 1963/1994, especially 302, 343 – 352). - "Новые люди не верили в революцию, они не были детьми революции, они были детьми созданного ею государства" (Гроссман, 1963/1994, 352) ("New humans did not believe on revolution, they were not children of revolution, but children of state which revolution created") - Jezov himself was later eliminated.
First of all should be eliminated social groups which would have own intellectual power and are able to confront manipulation. Such elimination is necessary although not sufficient presupposition for totalitarianism. These groups must be substituted by ones which have no idea of historical continuity.

Totalitarianism is an effort to annul history and break down the identifications at social proximity. It is form of Evil on foundation of this identification – and knowledge creation – breakdown and Evil has different forms on foundation of executed non-identification. Different forms – or degrees – may exist at breakdown of contingent social; at relative certainty constituting subjective action identification is possible for members of society or humanity. If these conditions are presented as nationalities or foreigners, the last ones may be justified to be killed in conditions of war or other situations of social salvation. It is same killing as killing for race or class and is different from the latter ones only when constituted on relation to contingent social. In all forms where Evil is created social identification is broken, not only weakened but annulled. Differences in processes where it is done does not justify anything; it only explains why it is considered justified; all forms of non-identification are probable Evil.

Elimination of social groups and classes which are not possible to be manipulated for history breakdown is a form – perhaps the most dramatic – of identification annulment. Probability is history. Probability is transferred at knowledge for a long periods. It constitutes social relations – and Evil; any probability difference of Good and Evil is not possible to constitute on history foundation. But the history breakdown constitutes very probable Evil. This principle of conservatism builds conservatism only if continuity is considered continuity of unique social order of social structures in history. If it is considered probability of morality over immorality it may also contain revolution. That probability is determined only at contingent social.

**Society Type of Integrity and Evil**

Every form of social rationality and integrity has forms of Evil it deserves.

Forms of rationality and integrity have also their types of suppression for morality. These are not dependent on the social orders created but social action and constitution of knowledge there is created. They are determined at identification processes of social.

Morality is not a product of society but society a product of morality. So is every other form of social. Processes for suppression of morality have exactly same origin in social creation processes as morality.

Instrumental rationality and society type of integrity are types of social responsibility. Special type of irresponsibility is created there in bare means-ends unique relationships. Their main property is certainty, regulation, especially in institutionalized forms of instrumental rationality, as bureaucracy and government. Neither means nor ends do define types of non-identification and irresponsibility; they are products of historical development, where is no necessities, but probabilities.

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44 “Only the mob and the elite can be attracted by the momentum of totalitarianism itself; the masses have to be won by propaganda” (Arendt, 1951, 333).
Unique connections of means-ends relations are properties of instrumental rationality itself. Certainty is a limiting value of morality. It may work in technical endeavours for ends, or even in relatively simple social affairs as enterprises seeking for profit. But presuppositions for relatively simple environments for defining morality more probable than immorality are specific conditions which cannot be connected to instrumental rationality in general – and even if they exist, it is not followed at too many cases.

Totalitarianism is a structural form of Evil. It is purely modern phenomenon. In evaluation based on means-ends calculations it is convenient to say that instrumental, or any other type of rationality is not Evil, but only its implementation. This is – relatively – true; bare and certain means-ends relationships at instrumental rationality lead at least even probability of morality and immorality. This situation can change by processes for social action probability distributions handling.

Types of pure Evil like Holocaust and Stalinism are apparently results of instrumental rationality, in its “modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization (Bauman, 1989/1991, 18)”45; there exist ‘the murderous compound’ of “a typically modern ambition of social design and engineering, mixed with the typically modern concentration of power, resources and managerial skills” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 77, see also Englund, 1996, 129).

The rational killings in Holocaust and Stalinism, or at terror bombardments of German cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, countersinking of Wilhelm Gustloff, are all forms of instrumental rationality. Racism is a modern phenomenon (Bauman, 1989/1991,73) or changes from ‘race-thinking’ into racism at modern development (Arendt, 1951, 158 – 184). Genocide is as old as humanity, but creates a totally new form at modernity, a radically different social form of genocide, genocide as a form of rationality (Englund, 1996,187), a ‘Gardeners vision’ for remaking society (Bauman, 1989/1991, 91). Even cruelty changes by its correlation with relationship of authority and subordination (Bauman, 1989/1991, 153).

Where does all this come from? From eternal ‘human nature’, ‘universal humanity’ or their change. Or from historical coincidences?

Human nature or universal humanity has nothing to do with this. Human nature exists not. Universal humanity constitutes on social identification. It exactly is annulled but it can change.

45 Bauman is very explicit in demonstrating the connection of Holocaust and instrumental rationality. Bureaucracy “had made the Holocaust-style solution not only possible, but eminently ‘reasonable’ – and increased the probability of their choice” and to “co-ordinate the action of great number of moral individuals in the pursuit of any, also immoral, ends (Bauman, 1989/1991, 18); “bureaucracy is intrinsically capable of genocidal action” Bauman, 1989/1991, 106). Idea that “mass murder is not a modern invention” denies “the uniqueness of the Holocaust” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 88) and definitely “Holocaust was as much a product, as it was a failure, of modern civilization” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 89). – All these arguments however emphasize the formal type of rationality – means-ends relations. It does not consider historical reasons. Arendt (Arendt, 1951) concentrates on those.

46 Bauman emphazises - on foundation of Milgram's studies (Milgram, 1974) - that “cruelty is not committed by cruel individual, but by ordinary men and women trying to acquit themselves well of their ordinary duties” … “cruelty correlates but poorly with the personal characteristics of its perpetrators, it correlates very strongly indeed with the relationship of authority and subordination” (Bauman, 1989/1991, 153). - Grossman (Гроссман, 1963/1994, 297 – 304) emphazises that denouncers at Jezovtshina were ordinary people who were not able to fight against circumstances.
Properties of interaction are pure, depend on interaction itself; there is no human nature determining them, but social definitions of risk and probability – and knowledge on foundation of them. The social and non-social characteristics of immorality do arise from interaction.

Instrumental rationality is property of action, also mediation of knowledge. There is no possibility to create knowledge for properties which are not socially determined - as so called 'race'; it is even not possible to determine that such exists. This is not a rational starting point and not based on knowledge. On these conditions racism, especially its Nazism type which is not possible to determine by any social conditions, is not a property of instrumental rationality or modernity although its implementation was. It is outside contingent social and rationality.

All things are different with Stalinism. Stalinism manipulates rationality, Nazism is irrational, although fulfils the requirements of formal instrumental rationality, better than ably. Instead of natural guilt at Nazism Stalinism introduced statistical guilt. Statistical guilt is indeed a very rational idea; and also compatible with idea about Stalinism as direct heir of Enlightenment (Englund, 1996, 127, see before). It is quite probable that counter revolutionary activity is statistically distributed among people. Still more probable is that people who are able to think and confront manipulation belong to certain social groups and even classes - but not heritage. That is why Jezovtshina is key for alienation and non-identification.

At statistical guilt every rajon committee had its plan for imprisonments with exact quotas for statistical distributions of arrested. Its obeying was required by Bolshevist rigour 47. Alienation of identities was based on probability and focused on statistical guilt.

Supposition of the social, historical creation of ‘human nature’, actually rationality, developing into probable relative certainty means that natural or structural kinds of alienation do not work; statistical guilt of Stalinism is perhaps the upfront echo of the network society.

**Humanism, Anti-Humanism**

When social relation of identification – or subjective responsibility – and proximity on foundation of probability are set to grounds of social action, membership in humankind has to be determined by them. There is no absolute criterion for determination of this identification and there is no way to create knowledge on such criteria in social ways and further no way to understand constitution of purposive action, rationality and social integrity.

This makes morality the identification factor of humankind and humanity. Its kernel is humanism based on that Good is more probable than Evil. This however does not mean that immorality may exist outside humankind; it is identification factor too, socially determined.

Identification is based on bare, mere and pure subjective, individual action without interests or structural obligations. This is based on development of global

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47 “En tatarkvinna blev först finkad som trotskist, men de som arresterade henne upptäckte tyvärr att de redan fylt sin kvot av trotskister, varefter de raskt omrubricerade henne till borgerlig nationalist” (Englund, 1996, 81). (“One Tatar woman was first caged as Trotskyist but those who arrested her unfortunately found out that they had already filled their quota of Trotskyists, after which she was quickly headlined bourgeois nationalist”).
dimensions of social and their constitution at individual connections of global and history. Probability of Good over Evil depends on development of global dimension of social. On its foundation is neither authority, interest nor obligation; it is based only on meaningful knowledge mediated at probable social relations.

If history dimension is dominating social interaction morality probability is based on continuity and tradition. Social identification on these foundations creates communities where continuity is based on. Its responsibility form is tradition and external authority. At structural social relations on constant global-history connections alienation of human identification is based directly on behaviour according to instrumental rationality, constituting society type of integrity. This is at the same time its form of responsibility. Non-identification is built-in at the relationships. At individual relationships these non-identification processes are made on foundation of on probability build relative certainties. There is only statistical methods of non-identification. If the social structures are missing identifications do not form for example nationalities, classes and probably not also ideologies in the form where these are known at structural relations. Important is that although individual action itself procedures suppression of morality, individual morality is difficult, improbable to be manipulated – and that is why Jezovsthina is needed for totalitarianism - there is still created social formations - limiting values of action - where suppression practices are probable.

Every conception of ‘human nature’ can be used in humanist and anti-humanist purposes, by even probability. If social nature of Good and Evil is not understood probability of anti-humanism increases dramatically. Universal knowledge about conditions of action which are not socially determined cannot be created and if knowledge is not created there is no action; probability for non-social and non-morality increases. These conceptions may serve humanistic purposes if the conditions where they are developed and applied are defined at limited worlds; on these conditions they can serve even science - as ‘economic man’ does. If these conditions are not defined, any ‘race’ of racism or ‘Aryan’ of Nazism is not needed but ‘anything goes’.

Man making his own history\(^{48}\) for ‘conscious beginning of the history of mankind’ constitutes human condition (Arendt 1958, also Arendt, 1951, 437 - 439). It is pluralist conception for constituting human action where ‘nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives of will live’. Human activities and capabilities at human condition do not constitute human nature and they cannot ‘explain what we are or answer the question of who we are’; ‘they never condition us absolutely’ (Arendt 1958, 8 – 11). – This is not only on probability of conditions for human action. When humanity is contingent, historical conditions which are limited cannot create ‘human nature’ or ‘new human’; it would require infinite regulation. As ‘necessity of development’ such an idea will mean anti-humanist development - at its extreme Stalinism\(^ {49}\).

Human constituted on activities of his own, on ‘the greatest happiness principle’ of utilitarian arguments (Mill, 1861/1972), actually supposes properties which ‘we are’ independently of conditions; everyone’s happiness creates the happiness of

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\(^{48}\) Marx in ‘Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, 1852.

\(^{49}\) Marx was right when he said the the history of societies is history of class struggles (Manifesto of Communist Party, 1848). But society is not the definite form of social life; it is one integrity type of social. There is politics which is based on human nature and politics which is based on social nature of human. If the latter one is defined general, and supposed that it must be tempered by some action of ‘society’, also government, the result is not much better than the first one.
all: ‘...the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of the others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator’ (Mill, 1861/1972, 16). – From happiness of individual can be created happiness of all only at infinite regulation processes – ‘In the long Run’. There is only unspecified risks (Mäkinen, 2009/14). Necessity for it creates anti-humanist action. Its variant conception is society’s activity at restraining egoistic human; it requires as infinite regulation.

In-humanity is a function of distance (Bauman, 1989/1991, 155 – 157) but distance is social, probability of social identification. Absolute social distance may be created by anything which requires infinite regulation at limited conditions. Anti-humanism is created when course of social action is considered necessary - which is an other expression for infinite regulation Then is not understood that the ways of action are rationally selected by subjects themselves. Historical conditions for action are never parallel but action in different conditions may constitute anti-humanism, always by necessity: ‘history shall give us justification’ building atom bomb against Hitler’s aggression (Englund, 1996, 243 – 245), perpetrating genocide for salvation of government 50 - or saving financial market.

The first step at creating non-identification and anti-humanism is demonizing human beings; it is first step of totalitarian taught - and in a frightening way also its ‘modern’ critics.

The conditions of humanity - Good more probable than Evil – are not possible to determine exactly at individual action; they are based on uncertainty and should be evaluated at social processes. Evaluation of humanism and anti-humanism is based on how deeply they influence into social interaction, how deeply they constitute or interrupt history and how at them people are lived or from them survived. And for anti-humanism how it dies.

The Rank Order for Evil

When responsibility is social probability and continuity, killing someone does not by default maintain it. When it anyhow is socially permissible in some cases – may it be war – against terrorism or other ones - , terror bombardments, extermination camps or something milder – and this is functional on social continuity, properties of responsibility at these phenomena are not only possible but necessary – and society has such a morality it needs (Bauman, 1989/1991, 172).

It must be admitted that there are – real - issues, which are definitely insensate. This is a property of social but not managed risk - which is contradiction at creation process of social. ‘Insensate’ means non-knowledge, non-responsibility, non-social – but however probability; small in the 10 000 years history of instrumental rationality 51 but real. This is a principal difference to the Hegelian law of relationship of reasonable and real. - Grossman was right (Grossman, 1963/1994, 374).

50 Stalin’s monolog in Rybakov’s ‘Children of Arbat’: “ Если при этом погибнет несколько миллионов человек, история простит это товарищу Сталину. Если же он оставит государство беззащитным, обречет его на гибель - история не простит ему никогда. ... Все великие правители были жестоки” (Рыбаков, 1987/2004, 278 - 279). (“Although in that process (salvation of government) would be destroyed a couple of millions of people, history will forgive comrade Stalin. But if he contrariwise leaves government unprotected, into destruction, history will not forgive him... All great sovereigns have been cruel”)

51 This is a civilized guess. - On instrumental rationality and social structures is connected some centralization; it is probable that there is also urbanization. The oldest information
Evil arises when there is no possibility to create knowledge and mediate it at social interaction - but social interaction still happens. These conditions exist at different levels. Conditions where knowledge is probable may be defined, and if they are, knowledge may be evaluated on those conditions; there are reasons. Evil has degrees according to influences at social interaction. According to them Evil comes and goes – and its going is possible to foresee. If conditions are not possible to define, there is no knowledge how and when Evil goes. – It probably must be destroyed because Good is more probable than Evil.

Evil is not wanted, it happens. Probability of social events defines conditions where wanting is Purpose and Good. These are properties of continuing social and not build anywhere than at social relations; anyhow Evil has relation to social - brutes are not evil. If ends and means are not connected, there is no responsibility, and probability of continuing social relations. There is social incidents which are absolutely insane, because social is contingent, coincidental. Sensible exists only in conditions of contingent social.

Contingent social is interaction relation without considerations of properties of participants or their interests and requirements. If it is supposed such properties they may be contingent social or not. About human nature can be created knowledge only on conditions where are not presupposed infinite generalizations, also at limited - empirically or some other way - conditions. If there is required infinite generalizations, Evil is possible, in advantageous conditions probable. If those conditions exist not, it is absolute. This is a limiting value, which Nazism approaches.

It is a theoretical and empirical mistake to equalize Nazism and Stalinism. The first one is outside the building processes of contingent social, the latter – how painful it may be – inside it, as are terror bombardments and atom bombs. Their differences are in knowledge objects and processes where knowledge is created and interaction build on their foundation - not in the relationships of means and ends52.

When Stalinism exists on conditions of contingent social it has a reason. But it is based on supposition that on history may be made a breakdown where ‘New Human’ is created. This is principally connected to concrete social relations (like classless society and egalitarianism). But instead that human self would make ‘New Human’ by history breakdown it degenerates from ‘Human Condition’ (Arendt) - also being with other, responsibility and proximity - into ‘Human Nature’ on which cannot be created knowledge - and Evil is created.

By terror bombardments and atombombs the new Human Being - or at least German or Japanese - was perhaps possible to create; the objectives were limited. But was not new human being already created when Wilhelm Gustloff was

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52 Arendt asserts that Nazism ans Stalinism are “two essentially identical systems” (Arendt, 1951, 429). First in her argumentation seems to be question of a simple ‘human nature’ defined on utilitarian principles. Later (Arendt, 1951, 435) question is about ‘Human condition’ (Arendt, 1958) which is general humanitarian identity, Man for ‘conscious begining of the history of mankind’ (Arendt, 1951, 437). - By latter arguments Nazism and Stalinism cannot be equalized, because they had a different kind of ‘human nature’ and they terrorized different ‘human natures’. The only question of humanity is human identification. Arendt’s answers confuse this and make difficult the evaluation of totalitarianism.
overwhelmed on icy Baltic Sea at January 1945 and 10 000 people - mostly wounded, women and children with hundreds of sucklings, not Germans - were drowned (Grass, 2002)? Or when Dresden was bombarded at February 1945 and 40 000 human beings – not Germans - did burn into ashes (Vonnegut, 1969/2003)? Or when atom bombs were dropped into Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 140 000 human beings – not Japanese – were killed. There is no concrete reasons for these atrocities; they are at the count of Evil. – But still on the frames of social.

Evil at count of Human Nature is deeply connected with instrumental rationality and modernity. The former forms of Evil did have some other reasoning, based on Deity or Nature. The nature which was active in Nazi-human-nature was not same one than modern Human Nature on instrumental foundations but creation processes of non-knowledge are same. Instrumental rationality is not the Evil, but it creates an Evil of its – crucially different than former ones - own.

Individual morality is difficult to manipulate. Stalinism could not generally do it but Nazism did. It was out of rational order, out of contingent social. Integrity is possible to create by violence but then it is based only on risk. Morality building probability is kernel of integrity. If it is demolished Evil must be destroyed; it cannot be changed. Nazism was demolished into its cavern. Stalinism was destroyed by Russian humanism: Puškin, Lermontov, Dostojewski, Tolstoi, Tšehov, Grossman and Brodsky. Not by tanks and artillery. German humanism is as deep as Russian. Its suppression was possible only by inhumanity out of contingent social – and not even then.

The degree of Evil on foundation of processes where Evil is created and where it dies is defined by rationality. If Evil has reason, on it is possible to influence by influencing to reason or cause. Reason or cause Evil may have if it goes on the conditions of social contingency. If it does not, there is no rational means to influence on it; Evil must be obstructed, and if not succeeded, probably destroyed.

Nazism and Stalinism have one feature in common: they predict death of society form of social integrity.

8. Moral Continuity and Change

"... no less is needed than the appearance of a new ethics, an ethics of distance and distant consequences... An ethics that would be unlike any other morality we know: one that would reach over the socially erected obstacles of mediated action and the functional reduction of human self" (Bauman, 1989/1991, 220 – 221).

Social Change of Moral Judgement

Constitution of social as relationships of responsibility for common good and interests instead of egoistic individuals’ interests creates structural type of social
integrity. There is possible to evaluate social as limitation of subjective action. This framework does not function in global network where such structures exist not. If social there exists – which is not at all clear – it must be based on quite other factors.

The society form of integrity is one form of social responsibility based on morality. It may build systems which act against morality and also this is based on the forms of action which is on foundation of it. ‘Society’ or social in general are not extraterrestrial formations but based on action grounded on knowledge relations. Same applies also at global integrity forms. There however are not possible generalized rules of action which determine society; also the morality which is foundation for social changes.

Social action is moral, based on freedom of choice between means and ends. It is based on social identification and mutual communication between human beings, which creates responsibility. The form of social action and social depends on how identification and means and ends as social objects are constituted; ‘free will’ has developing forms at interaction.

In the widening of identification of social objects social structures are broken and networks created.

Social rationality is a form of continuing social relationships, subjective mode of action which is constituted at the social probability building processes. At global knowledge relations in global communications networks connections of global and history, identification and social objects – and also means and ends - are probable. Knowledge relations at social action and morality decisions may be bound only on individual conditions, not on traditional or structural social conditions. This does not mean that action should be morally ‘more’ right than on other circumstances but it is not regulated by any spatiotemporal generality, ‘necessity’; people may choose their acting in a free way to make their own social – and also carry an individual responsibility about it.

Social relationships where global and history have unique connections presuppose conceptualizations which are based on probability building processes and also are not evident in present activity; it requires relationships into ‘distance’ in extension or time. This form of probable knowledge governs social interaction that creates a subjective meaning, certainty, of instrumental rationality and instrumental social relations. It presupposes generalization and categorization of social phenomena and social interaction mediated by these.

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54 “It is extremely important to know if society in the current sense of the term is the result of a limitation of the principle that men are predators of one another, or if to the contrary it results from the limitation of the principle that men are for one another. Does the social, with its institutions, universal forms and laws, result from limiting the consequences of the war between men, or from limiting the infinity which opens in the ethical relationship of man to man?” (Levinas 1982/1985, 80). – The concept of responsibility at Levinas thought is absolute, unconditional and without reciprocity. He refers often to Dostoevski: “We are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the others” (Levinas, 1982/1985, 98, also for example Levinas, 1962/1996, 18). – This seems to refer a passage (not direct citation) at The Brothers Karamazov, Book 6, Chapter 3 “Discussions and teachings of Prior Zosima” (Достоевский, 1880/2001, 329).

55 These are historically quite late phenomena. In archaic societies exist no economy (Sahlins, 1972/1981), the first forms of exchange are based on reciprocity (Mauss, 1923/1990, Malinowski, 1922/1987) and the first forms of instrumental exchange happened at the frontiers of communities (Polanyi, 1944/1957, 56 – 67). In general at social exists no
It may seem reasonable and interesting to consider that on the development of social interaction and knowledge mediating it is affecting the widening of social connections which happen at least partly independently of knowledge relations. This development may create the dimensions of time and space (Giddens, 1990, 16-20) and the global homogenous time for requirements of global interaction, the ‘Global present’ (Adam, 2000, 87, Adam, 2004). These are conceptual relationships into reality, relative certainties depending on social processes. In global communications network there is no matter do incidents happen geographically at 5 meters or 5000 kilometres distance. This does not depend on properties of communications network but on properties of knowledge; communications networks only make it actual question at social identification.

Development of probable knowledge and morality is development of global dimensions of knowledge relations. The formation of “standardised, “empty” dimensions” and “disembedding ... the “lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space” (Giddens, 1990, 20-21) is the development process of global knowledge relation and its geographical and temporal characteristics in the same process. It is not explained by historical causality but the development of the world where global relations have identified content, they also exist in social.

There exists no instrumental or other purposive action as such, but connected to a social knowledge relation mediating it. At instrumental relations objects are identified at social structures. Objects may be human beings in class structures, socially used material, means for some ends determined or sets of social incidents. When structural they are in social interaction considered instrumental. These are constituted on individual acts creating probability building processes by contingent social mediation.

Constitution of social relations or structures from singular activities would presuppose infinite regulation of social relations; these activities should be determined as purposive action or instrumental rationality by their own properties which are based on contingent knowledge relations; purposive and social are also and only at these contingent properties. They build continuing conceptual decisions and their risk management, by probability building which forms moral judgements. There is several – unlimited but finite number by risk and probability - such probable knowledge relations. The realized relations are based on historical conditions. Their form as probable knowledge is explicitly controversial. They may always be overruled - even when they are dominating ideologies or legislation governing ‘society’.

Global knowledge relations on probable connections of global and history are determined by objects as probable knowledge relations always. This is a specific form of social rationality (Mäkinen, 2012/11, Mäkinen, 2012/16). It may be called ‘network rationality’ because its foundation is in networks of global and historical components of social, and it builds networks at social integrity forms. The integrity of social relations at social action and there developed moral judgements have specific forms according to it.

The main content of rationality change is that objects are not possible to interpret instrumental; or rather such an interpretation does not have dominating social

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continuity, they are not prevailing social relations, but coincidental or recessive. Contents of social is defined by social action that has only individual properties and individual ‘values’ or ‘roles’ to be followed. Social based on particular identity or status dies (Touraine, 2000, especially 149 – 153, also Bauman, 2000, 22, Touraine, 1988)\textsuperscript{56}.

At knowledge relations may exist several relationships of Global and History. The social change is change of knowledge relation - knowledge probability building process - instead of a technological change. On it are based rationality and integrity change.

**Global Knowledge Relations**

The change of knowledge relations in global network constitutes conceptual relationships into reality, types of experience and social processes which mediate building of knowledge. It changes also the form of certainty which is on foundation of action, relative certainty, and by that purposive action, morality, rationality and integrity. These constitute on development of Global-dimension and the conditions for knowledge continuity building, its meaning. Knowledge universality forms are based on transferability of knowledge at individual properties and action rather than generality (Mäkinen, 2012/16, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5).

Conceptual knowledge in global network at transmission path (Mäkinen, 2012/16) builds social contents where social relations are based on. Without risk and probability specifications it has no spatiotemporal dimensions. When they are created is created historical continuity of knowledge and interaction it mediates, including conceptual relationships into reality and constituting social relations. On these are created logical network conceptions on transmission path. Action may exist in several logical networks, and a logical network may be present in several actions (Mäkinen, 2012/11, Mäkinen, 2011/Tr4, Mäkinen, 2012/16, Mäkinen, 2012/Tr5).

Components of social processes mediated by conceptual knowledge are globally transferable. They are connected with some process components based on continuity. A conceptual component may be present in several processes and one process may include several conceptual components. Process is not identified social by ‘absolute’ framework or criteria and includes several global and historical components. There may develop relative certainties where absolute frameworks are defined but then processes are no more global but instrumental and structural.

When it is said that instrumental social relations are not build in the global environment, it means that meaningful social continuity, also type of rationality constituting specific properties of action, is build on foundation which does not require existence of generally regulated social rules; it constitutes on meaningful knowledge and its continuity at individual moral judgements; those judgments themselves include responsibility required for social integrity creation. ‘Human nature’ is not egoistic anymore; or rather: egoism means that there are social structures regulating action; they are not result but grounds, probable form of

\textsuperscript{56} “Interpersonal and inter-cultural communication are possible only if we cease to define ourselves in terms of our possession of a particular identity, or by referring to a reason that is so abstract as to make it inseparable from a ruling class made up of property-owners or citizens”. Social action should be based on “something that is neither general nor particular, but unique: the individuation of every personal and collective existence” (Touraine, 2000, 153).
social interaction and basically knowledge relations on generality grounded conceptual relationships into reality.

Knowledge relations concerning ‘infinite’ social formations and structures are possible if these structures themselves are limited. Global relations are by knowledge transferability unlimited. Then is not created ‘infinite’ knowledge concerning them; such social process where it may be created is not possible socially. Unlimited but finite knowledge creation builds network information (Mäkinen 2008/12). Social forms in network are dependent on conditions where knowledge meaning is verified, identified in knowledge relations. Social depends on bare, pure and mere knowledge building continuity, responsibility and maintenance of that pure relation.

**Global Knowledge Relation and Information Security**

In social formations where exists no fixed relationship of global and history, or where unique probability match for means-ends connections are not defined, is however build established social relations by specific human considerations for purposive action. They are based on transferable components of services and networks and information security profiles (Mäkinen, 2012/10, Mäkinen, 2012/11, CommonCriteria).

All rationality and integrity types are forms of social responsibility and constitute on sets of moral judgments. They are not possible to set in any ‘rank order’ of morality. Any selection at social action or moral judgments does not follow the characteristics of value, instrumental or network rationality but they create probability building processes where these social categories are created. They differ however in processes where rationality is realized and in possible processes for morality manipulation. If independent ‘value systems’ - like ideologies or legislation - or ‘means systems’ - like organizations or governments - do not dominate social integrity, neither manipulation of morality cannot be based on corresponding systems. But means for manipulation may anyhow be created because always are created social formations on probability of social action. Action at probable connections of global and history has a closer connection to the moral judgement only in the sense that it is based on relative certainty which consist itself of individual morality and responsibility.

At individual moral judgements is not possible to establish any social relation like ‘solidarity’ (Durkheim, 1893/1984) or ‘coercive social facts’ (Durkheim, 1895/1982) in any other sense than by meaningful knowledge mediating responsible, also on identification based continuing, social interaction. Solidarity or social facts are not supported by external factors as historical communities, social structures or any continuing social relations corresponding them. Solidary relations’ meaning is not at all obvious if there is no constant relationship of global and history. This connection must be established, which means specifications for probability of these connections, also probability of knowledge relation considering incidents.

Continuity – meaning, probability - is the content of knowledge in every case. It may be truth or continuity in social action; these do not exclude or include each others. This relation may realize in traditional, historical community, social structures or knowledge continuity determination by properties of knowledge itself. In the last case the social determinant factor is information security, not as a protection of knowledge but trust on knowledge and its meaning, also existence and identification, as trust on moral value or continuity of social structure. This factor determines global-history connections.
In global knowledge relations (at global networks) the meaning of knowledge or trust as foundation of action is not guaranteed by established social formations; it is rather impossible that such should be created. When social relations are build on foundation of social structures, global networks have forms, like Internet, where service and security levels are equal to zero (Mäkinen, 2008/3). This means that social relations based on structures have no continuity; they are broken. Instead of them comes social relations based on probable connections of global and history. These are built on logical process and network components whose security is defined by information security profiles (Mäkinen, 2009/7, Mäkinen, 2012/16).

The global network should then be conceptualized as Globalnet defined by relationship of risk and probability without references into geographical global or constant social structures identified as networks of organisations or similar social units (Mäkinen, 2012/16). The social functionality of global network is determined by its information security and service level. Its social content is based on transferable network and process components mediated by transferable knowledge.

Information security as acts for protection of organizations’ knowledge has to do with the meaning of knowledge only through identification of knowledge at unique global-history relations. In same way information security profiles are parts of knowledge identification; they constitute operational definitions for contingent properties of social. Information security activities and propositions are connected with the social relations of instrumental social units or network relations; the 'worlds' where knowledge is created. Contingent properties define speciality of social which defines morality. For judgment to be moral it must fulfill information security specifications for knowledge existence and continuity.

On contents of moral judgements information security may have only a consequential relation as traditional communities or social structures. Information security is the consolidated form of existence of knowledge mediating social relationships. At global knowledge relations and social relationships it is actually the only consolidation mediating social.

In Globalnet, with integrity created by information security, there exists no centre or authority that may justify any social doctrine or regulations determining moral judgements – or actually their approximation. Even governments or organizations cannot have such a function; or rather they all have an equal function as moral authorities. Only individual responsibility can have a moral function.

**The Moral Content**

There is no need to discuss what moral content is but why it is moral and how it works at continuity of social interaction.

Either there is need to invent new contents of morality; they are all invented. People may be as revolutionary as they like but it is better to be satisfied when

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57 This common sense starting point originates to Burke (Burke, 1790/1986, see also Arendt, 1951, 438) who is usually considered arch-conservative. Principle is good remedy against ‘gardening’ endeavours (Bauman, 1989/1991, especially 66 – 72) for social and morality - also their constitution according to planned, usually manipulative, conceptions of ‘human nature’.
thoughts are not realized because majority in any case does not accept them\textsuperscript{58}. History cannot be broken. Morality does not maintain social continuity but is it.

If it is insisted that people should act according to principles that may be a general law - also if is supposed a categorical imperative\textsuperscript{59} – these principles are ‘reasonable’ on the ground that they are a probable guarantee for continuity of social relationships and also social integrity. Principles may be questioned but this is not functional regarding the continuity of social. There is no knowledge - science or other - that may convince that acting according to it is socially right, but social interaction may convince that it practically works. Nothing else is needed as long as social structures continue, society or community are defined, ‘general laws’ are defined, and concept ‘all in society’ has a meaning. Something else must be invented after that.

If those presuppositions are not valid, something guaranteeing the social continuity in a same way should come instead of categorical imperative. This may be its ‘original’ version – do for everybody what you will to be done for you (The Bible)\textsuperscript{60} – where is not supposed social structural relations but considered general principles of responsible action. Responsibility constitutes morality and social relationships. It does not require any explanation; it is based on identification of social objects at world based on contingent knowledge relations. But there is no possible immediate social process to conclude who are the ‘others’ according to whom we should orientate; we can orientate only through others which are identified and experienced in processes which social itself determines and which are different depending on the probability building processes where knowledge is created. ‘Others’ also presuppose processes for knowledge, information security and morality building; they are not ‘given’ somewhere but made by people, and the form where this is done creates identification of social. When this is considered to be the universal principle, it is a property of purposive action and itself changes.

Moral judgement is not the answer at the situation where we know, but at the situation where we suspect; morality and social are based on risk on which foundation all experience, all identification of social objects is a conceptual relationship into reality. That is why we suspect every historical continuity of social relationship. Its certainty presupposes a probability equal to 1. It may not be reached but it may be supposed. We can make an individual solution. That is the moral judgement.

When society and moral judgement are interpreted contingent, not dependent on any divine will or absolute human interests, question is not at all that they should be directed by the so called scientific knowledge, also without value and moral judgements. But Human can create, change and develop those judgements in social in ways Human wants. If then - as by a great probability happens - is stated as a social end the concern about everybody and elimination of poverty, no one can in

\textsuperscript{58} “… in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they are prevailed, the more we cherish them” (Burke, 1790/1986, 183).

\textsuperscript{59} “Der kategorische Imperativ ist also nur ein einziger, und zwar diese: handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie eine allgemeines Gesetz werde” (Kant, 1785/1974, 51). “Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne” (Kant, 1788/1974, 140).

\textsuperscript{60} This is rather a general human relationship of mutual responsibility that the Christian morality has adopted.
the name of divine economy or any other reason require an abandonment of this priority. Such a requirement has no scientific foundation. Social development is based neither on divine moral, law nor divine economy, but on human dignity.

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61 “Whoever willingly or by default partakes of the cover-up or, worse still, the denial of the human-made, non-inevitable, contingent and alterable nature of social order, notably of the kind of order responsible for unhappiness, is guilty of immorality – of refusing help to a person in danger” (Bauman, 2000, 215).
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